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ABSTRACT
Parallel-topology inference networks consist of spatially-distributed sensing agents that
collect and transmit observations to a central node called the fusion center (FC), so that a
global inference is made regarding the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI). In this dissertation,
we address two types of statistical inference, namely binary-hypothesis testing and scalar-
parameter estimation in parallel-topology inference networks. We address three different
types of security threats in parallel-topology inference networks, namely Eavesdropping
(Data-Confidentiality), Byzantine (Data-Integrity) or Jamming (Data-Availability) attacks.
In an attempt to alleviate information leakage to the eavesdropper, we present optimal/near-
optimal binary quantizers under two different frameworks, namely differential secrecy
where the difference in performances between the FC and Eve is maximized, and con-
strained secrecy where FC’s performance is maximized in the presence of tolerable secrecy
constraints. We also propose near-optimal transmit-diversity mechanisms at the sensing
agents in detection networks in the presence of tolerable secrecy constraints. In the context
of distributed inference networks with M-ary quantized sensing data, we propose a novel
Byzantine attack model and find optimal attack strategies that minimize KL Divergence at
the FC in the presence of both ideal and non-ideal channels. Furthermore, we also propose
a novel deviation-based reputation scheme to detect Byzantine nodes in a distributed infer-
ence network. Finally, we investigate optimal jamming attacks in detection networks where
the jammer distributes its power across the sensing and the communication channels. We
also model the interaction between the jammer and a centralized detection network as a
complete-information zero-sum game. We find closed-form expressions for pure-strategy
Nash equilibria and show that both the players converge to these equilibria in a repeated
game. Finally, we show that the jammer finds no incentive to employ pure-strategy equilib-
ria, and causes greater impact on the network performance by employing mixed strategies.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Inference Networks
Statistical inference has played a cardinal role in the growth of modern technology, and
is quintessential in almost every application when there is uncertainty within the collected
data. This demand for statistical inference has been bolstered by significant advancements
in the design of sensors and their networks over the past decade. In the context of clas-
sical inference, a single powerful sensing agent is designed /chosen to collect data and
make inferences about a phenomenon-of-interest (PoI). Such a sensor requires expensive
technologies to facilitate high-performance inference-tasks. Furthermore, other practical
difficulties such as PoI-shadowing and short battery life can severely degrade the inference
performance. Therefore, inference networks have been proposed where several low-cost
sensing agents are installed to collect data in a spatially distributed manner. Although these
distributed sensing agents are inexpensive and have limited computational, bandwidth and
energy resources, a significant number of such spatially-distributed low-cost agents collab-
orate and share resources and processing effort to achieve a prescribed performance. In
order to make inference networks practically viable, several researchers had pursued ex-
tensive work in the design and analysis of these networks under different scenarios and
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Figure 1.1: Inference Network Applications
applications (See [1, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 47, 60, 61, 64, 65, 69] and references therein). To-
day, inference networks span over a broad range of applications such as distributed radar
surveillance in the military domain, traffic-control networks, agricultural sensor networks
and disaster-monitoring in the commercial cyber-physical domain and, various other appli-
cations in stock markets, crowdsensing, smart-homes and wearable body sensors to facili-
tate e-health, as pointed out in Figure 1.1.
As shown in Figure 1.2, there are fundamentally two types of inference networks de-
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Figure 1.2: Topological Configurations of Inference Networks
pending on the presence/absence of a central node called the fusion center (FC), where a
global inference is made regarding the PoI [69]. Furthermore, inference networks with the
FC can be configured in different topologies based on their application needs. In parallel-
topology inference networks, sensing agents collect and transmit either processed/unprocessed
observations to the FC. In general, parallel-topology inference networks can be classified
into two types, namely centralized and distributed inference networks, based on how the
information is processed in the network. In a centralized inference network, the sensing
agents transmit unprocessed observations to the FC using an amplify-and-forward strategy.
The term centralized indicates that the data is only processed centrally at the FC. On the
other hand, in a distributed inference network, sensing agents compress observations into
a finite alphabet set and transmit compressed symbols to the FC. Due to the transmission
of a finite alphabet set, the bandwidth requirement for the distributed inference network is
significantly reduced at the expense of a minimal deterioration in inference performance.
4Note that the parallel-topology inference network is an umbrella term used to label net-
works where sensors can communicate to the FC either over dedicated channels, multiple-
access channels, or communication webs (internet) [65]. In contrast, serial-topology in-
ference networks comprise of spatially distributed sensing agents that collaborate together
in a linear hop-by-hop manner, in relaying their observations to the FC. Such networks
are found in special applications such as vehicular networks where the sensors are aligned
along the road. Other topological configurations that have been studied extensively, range
from tree networks [58, 59] to collaborative inference networks [23, 32, 33] where sensors
collaborate with each other in order to alleviate transmission costs. In some practical appli-
cations where the infrastructure cost is very high, inference networks are designed without
an FC. In such cases, each sensing agent shares processed/unprocessed observations with
the neighboring nodes in an ad-hoc manner, and makes a global inference based on the
information shared over several iterations.
In this dissertation, we focus on parallel-topology inference networks that are designed
to address two fundamental statistical inference problems, namely binary hypothesis-testing
and scalar parameter estimation. In the case of binary hypothesis-testing, the goal is to de-
tect the presence or absence of a given phenomenon-of-interest (PoI). On the other hand, in
the case of scalar parameter estimation, the goal is to estimate a scalar parameter regarding
the PoI. We analyze the vulnerabilities of a parallel-topology inference network, and design
them under three different types of security threats, namely eavesdropping, Byzantine and
jamming attacks. These attacks are discussed in greater detail in Section 1.2.
In the following subsection, we present our basic system model for the inference net-
work, and introduce some notation to label the signals and decisions made at both the local
sensing agents as well as the FC. Depending on the need, we may further introduce more
notation in the future chapters.
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1.1.1 Notations and System Model
Consider a parallel-topology inference network with N sensing agents which sense a given
PoI, as shown in Figure 1.3. Let θ ∈ Θ denote the parameter representing the PoI’s state,
where Θ is the set of all possible states of the PoI. For example, in the case of binary
hypothesis-testing, Θ , {0, 1}. Similarly, in the case of scalar parameter estimation,
Θ , R. Since there are two types of channels in any given inference network that a given
sensor encounters, we resolve this confusion by labeling these two channels as follows. We
refer to the channel between the PoI and the sensor as a sensing channel, and the channel
between the sensor and the FC as a communication channel.
6In this dissertation, we use regular and bold symbols to denote scalar and vector quanti-
ties respectively. For example, we denote the received signal (observation) at the ith sensing
agent as ri. In the case where the ith sensing agent collects a scalar observation, we denote
it as ri. For the sake of generality, we will use the bold notation to denote various quantities,
unless otherwise stated.
We assume the following signal received at the ith sensing agent over its sensing chan-
nel:
ri = f i(θ) + ni, (1.1)
where f i(·) is a known, deterministic and invertible function for all i = 1, · · · , N , and ni
is a zero-mean additive-white Gaussian noise with covariance matrix Σs. Having acquired
the symbol ri, the ith sensing agent processes (amplifies or compresses) it into a symbol ui
before relaying it to a central node called the fusion center (FC).
We consider two different types of communication channels in this dissertation. In the
first type, we assume that the communication channel is discrete and memoryless, in which
case, we denote the received symbol from the ith sensing agent as vi. In the second type
of communication channels, we assume that the FC receives a real-valued signal which
is denoted as rfcj at the j
th receiving antenna (or, channel use). Based on the received
messages, FC makes a global inference θˆ regarding the state of the PoI.
1.2 Security Threats in Inference Networks
Due to its wide range of applications and technological impact, vulnerabilities in the design
of inference networks pose a very significant problem that ought to be addressed with great
concern. Moreover, new security threats are discovered every day to bring down various
networks, particularly in the context of cyber-physical systems. Although many traditional
approaches have been proposed to address security, they also demand large amounts of
resources such as computational power and latency. In addition, most of these approaches
7Figure 1.4: Security Framework
rely on mathematical conjectures that assume the absence of any computationally tractable
algorithm to crack them.
On the other hand, most inference networks consist of sensing agents with limited
computational and bandwidth resources. Therefore, the design of secure inference net-
works demands novel techniques that protect the network using provably simple designs
and computationally tractable algorithms. Initial attempts in this direction were made in
the last decade by [24, 48, 49], which were mainly inspired by traditional security designs.
As the security threats have evolved to be more powerful and directed specifically towards
inference networks, there is an immediate need for system-level approaches to either pre-
vent or mitigate these security threats from deteriorating the inference performance of the
network. In the remaining section, we present a basic framework for security in order to
broadly classify the attacker’s endeavor, which has been discussed extensively in the tradi-
tional security literature.
Security threats have been traditionally classified into three types, based on the system
aspects threatened by attackers: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (in short, CIA).
In this dissertation, we follow the same taxonomy to discuss security threat models in
8inference networks. Note that the above CIA framework for security can be configured to
address different services in networking such as node identities, node location and data. In
this dissertation, we investigate the decision-theoretic aspects of the CIA framework, where
the attacker is assumed to interfere with various aspects of data flowing in the network. In
the remaining section, we describe briefly how these security threats classified under the
decision-theoretic CIA framework impact the inference performance.
• Data Confidentiality: Data confidentiality broadly addresses the problem of data ex-
filtration from the inference network to an unauthorized, third-party entity. There are
several approaches that the attacker can employ, in order to extract any given infor-
mation from the inference network. All of these approaches can be broadly classified
into two types. In the first type, the attacker gains access to the data repositories of
a given entity within the inference network, and extracts private information. This
attack model is traditionally labeled as a threat on the privacy of data, and various
solutions have been proposed to stall any unauthorized data access in the inference
network. In the second approach, the attacker extracts useful information by eaves-
dropping the transmitted information via wiretapping the communication channels
between the sensing agents and the FC. This attack model is labeled as a threat to the
secrecy of data in an inference network, and the readers can refer to [22] for a survey
on state-of-the-art solutions to this security threat.
• Data Integrity: Data integrity in inference networks refers to the authenticity of data
in terms of its accuracy in value. Such discrepancies in data can be achieved by the
attacker by either creating false identities through network infiltration, or by compro-
mising and enslaving an existing sensing agent within the inference network. In the
context of data accuracy, the attacker injects falsified sensing data into the network
either to randomize the global inference, or to manipulate it in a specific manner.
For more details on how data-falsification attacks with the intent of randomizing the
global inference (labeled as Byzantine attacks) are mitigated, the readers may refer to
9some of the solution approaches in [68]. On the other hand, one may find instances
of data falsification attacks with the intent of manipulating the global inference in
a specific manner in the case of spectrum sensing in cognitive-radio (CR) networks
where CR agents compete for vacant spectrum.
• Data Availability: Data availability in inference networks points out to security at-
tacks where data is made unavailable at any entity in the inference network. In the
case of attacks which introduce temporal inconsistencies in data acquisition or trans-
mission, there is a latency in the inference mechanism, thus resulting in untimely
decisions. Another attack that falls into this category is the case where the attacker
scrambles the identities of the sensing agents, in which case, the inference perfor-
mance at the FC deteriorates significantly. Among all the attacks within the context
of data availability, jamming attacks are extensively studied by several researchers. In
this attack model, the jammer introduces disruptive interference in either the sensing
channel, the communication channels, or both, in order to deteriorate the inference
performance of the network.
In the real world, more complex threats can be found where the attackers adopt hybrid
models to maximally disrupt the operation of the inference network. For example, a smart
jammer may first eavesdrop the channel and use this information to optimize its jamming
strategy in order to cause maximal impact on the performance of the inference network.
This dissertation attempts to understand the design limitations in the context of three sim-
ple attack models, and provides a basic foundation for the future design and analysis of
inference networks in the presence of complex, real-world attackers. In the remaining part
of this chapter, we summarize the contributions of this dissertation.
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1.3 Major Contributions
As pointed out in the earlier section, inference networks suffer from a wide variety of se-
curity threats. Since these security threats are driven by various motives, there is a demand
for a unique design for securing inference networks from each of these security threats.
Therefore, we design secure inference networks in the presence of three attack models,
namely eavesdropping, Byzantine and jamming attacks, each of which is derived from one
of the three issues within the CIA framework. We throw light on fundamental design-limits
and simple mitigation techniques for inference networks under each of these attack models.
In the remainder of this section, we summarize the contributions of this dissertation in the
aforementioned attack scenarios.
Eavesdropping Attack
In this dissertation, we address data confidentiality in inference networks within the context
of secrecy threats, by considering the problem of an eavesdropping attack in detection
(binary hypothesis testing) networks. In the past, a few attempts have been made to address
the problem of eavesdropping threats by designing stochastic ciphers at the sensing agents
[3, 20, 41]. In contrast, Marano et al. had designed optimal decision rules for a censoring
sensor network in the presence of eavesdroppers in [36], where they had assumed that Eve
can only determine whether an individual sensor transmits its decision or not.
In this dissertation, we consider a more realistic scenario where Eve can extract more
information than just merely determining the presence or absence of transmission, and
hence can make a reasonably good decision regarding the PoI, based on its receptions. In
the case of distributed detection networks [J1, C1], we consider the problem of design-
ing binary quantizers at the local sensing agents in the presence of a tolerable constraint
on eavesdropper’s inference performance. In Chapter 2, we design optimal binary quan-
tizers in a detection network where all the sensing agents are conditionally independent
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and identically distributed (i.i.d.) under the true hypothesis. Furthermore, due to the in-
tractable nature of the design of a general detection network with non-identical sensing
agents, we propose an efficient design for the local quantizers using a greedy algorithm.
On the other hand, in the case of centralized detection networks [C2], we propose a near-
optimal transmit diversity mechanism at the sensing agents in Chapter 3, in order to maxi-
mize the detection performance at the FC while constraining the detection performance at
the eavesdropper.
Byzantine Attack
In our attempt to address the issue of data integrity, we consider the problem of Byzantine
attacks in distributed inference networks. In the past, several efforts have been made to
address the problem of Byzantine attacks in distributed inference networks with different
topologies, especially when the sensors employ binary quantization to compress their ob-
servations. Byzantine attacks on centralized inference networks have been addressed in the
context of smart grids in [26]. For a detailed survey on related works on inference networks
in the presence of Byzantine attacks, the reader may refer to the survey by Vempaty et al.,
in [68].
In this dissertation, we investigate the problem of distributed inference with M-ary
quantized data at the sensors in the presence of Byzantine attacks in Chapter 4. We propose
a general attack model where the Byzantine nodes modify the original quantized message
into another symbol within the quantization alphabet-set using a probability distribution.
In the presence of noiseless communication channels, we show that the optimal Byzan-
tine attack deteriorates drastically in terms of the blinding fraction of Byzantine nodes,
as the quantization alphabet size increases. We also deduce the optimal Byzantine attack
in the presence of discrete memoryless channels between the sensors and the FC. In the
case where the Byzantine attack cannot afford to launch an optimal attack, we find an at-
tack from a restricted space of highly-symmetric attack strategies, that maximally degrades
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the performance of the inference network in the presence of resource-constrained Byzan-
tine attacks. Furthermore, a reputation-based scheme for identifying Byzantine nodes is
also presented as the network’s strategy to mitigate the impact of Byzantine threats on the
inference performance. We also provide asymptotic analysis to find the optimal reputation-
based scheme as a function of the fraction of compromised nodes in the network.
Jamming Attack
Within the context of data-availability, we consider the problem of jamming attacks on
inference networks which intentionally disrupt both the sensing and the communication
channels simultaneously by introducing interference. In the past, several attempts have
been made to address and mitigate jamming threats in inference networks. For more details,
the reader may refer to [39, 75] and references therein. In this dissertation, we consider
a novel decision-theoretic approach within the context of detection networks where the
jammer optimizes its attack strategy so as to minimize the detection performance of the
network.
In Chapter 5, we consider the problem of finding the optimal jamming attack in a sim-
ple detection network where there is only one sensing agent, for the sake of illustration.
Furthermore, we also assume that all the entities (PoI, sensing agent, FC and the jammer)
lie on a straight line. The goal of the jammer is to distribute its power between the sens-
ing and the communication channels in such a way that the error probability at the FC is
maximized. Since the problem is non-convex and intractable, we investigate the optimal
solution numerically and illustrate the results for different example scenarios. On the other
hand, in Chapter 6, we model a zero-sum game between a centralized detection network
and the jammer, and investigate Nash equilibria. In particular, we find closed-form expres-
sions for a family of pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and also show that the jammer has no
incentive to employ any of these pure-strategy equilibria in a complete-information game
under strict power constraints.
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CHAPTER 2
SECRECY IN DISTRIBUTED DETECTION:
DESIGN OF BINARY QUANTIZERS
Secrecy in the context of distributed detection networks is an important problem, espe-
cially when the network is a sub-system within a larger cyber-physical system. Following
are some examples where confidentiality plays a very important role in the context of dis-
tributed inference. First, consider the example of a distributed radar network where the
radars observe the presence or absence of an enemy aircraft. Any information about the
radar decisions at the enemy aircraft can help it to adapt its strategy so as to remain invisi-
ble to the radar and in clandestine pursuit of its mission. Another example is the case of a
cognitive-radio (CR) network where an eavesdropper may be able to use a given vacant PU
channel, without paying any participation costs to the network moderator. Thus, selfishness
and maliciousness can be two motives of any eavesdropper to compromise the confiden-
tiality of any inference network. In this chapter, we address confidentiality in distributed
detection networks and focus on the design of the network such that the eavesdropper may
not acquire any information beyond tolerable limits.
In this chapter, we consider a distributed detection network in the presence of noisy
channels between the sensors and the FC, as well as those between the sensors and the
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Eve, whose transition probabilities are known to the network designer. We address the no-
tion of secrecy in two different frameworks, namely differential secrecy and constrained
secrecy. In Section 2.4, we address the framework of differential secrecy by designing
optimal binary quantizers at the sensors that maximize the difference between the KL Di-
vergences at FC and Eve. We show that the structure of the optimal sensor quantizers are
either likelihood ratio test (LRT) based, or uninformative depending on the quality of the
Eve’s channels. On the other hand, in Section 2.5, we address the framework of constrained
secrecy where we design optimal binary sensor quantizers that maximize KL Divergence
at the FC while constraining the Eve’s KL Divergence to a prescribed tolerance level. We
consider two scenarios, one where the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise,
channels between sensors and the Eve) are modeled as identical binary symmetric chan-
nels (BSCs), and the second where the channels are modeled as non-identical BSCs. In
Section 2.5.1, we consider the identical channel scenario, where we show that the structure
of the optimal quantizer at the local sensors is a likelihood ratio test (LRT). We present
an illustrative example where we assume that the sensors make noisy observations of a
known deterministic signal. We present an algorithm to find the optimal threshold so as
to maximize the KL Divergence at the FC while ensuring that the Eve’s KL Divergence
remains within tolerable limits. In Section 2.5.2, we consider the scenario where channels
are non-identical, where we decompose the problem into N subproblems to be solved se-
quentially using dynamic programming. Consequently, we decouple the Eve’s constraint
into N individual constraints, thus allowing us to solve each of these decoupled problems
as in the identical sensor case.
2.1 Literature Survey
In the past, a few attempts have been made to address the problem of eavesdropping threats
by designing ciphers in the broader context of sensor networks. For example, Aysal et al.
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in [3] investigated the problem of secure distributed estimation by incorporating a stochas-
tic cipher in the existing sensor networks to improve secrecy. They showed a significant
deterioration in Eve’s performance (in terms of bias and mean squared error) at the cost
of a marginal increase in the estimation variance at the FC. A similar attempt has been
made in the context of distributed detection in sensor networks by Nadendla in [41], where
the author presented an optimal network (sensor quantizers, flipping probabilities in the
stochastic cipher and the fusion rule) that minimizes the error probability at the FC in the
presence of a constraint on Eve’s error probability. In [20], Jeon et al. proposed a coop-
erative transmission scheme for a sensor network where the sensors are partitioned into
non-flipping, flipping and dormant sets, based on the thresholds dictated by the FC. The
non-flipping set of sensors quantize the sensed data and transmit them to the FC, while the
flipping sensors transmit flipped decisions in order to confuse the Eve. The sensors within
the dormant set sleep, in order to conserve energy and we have an energy-efficient sensor
network with longer lifetime.
In all of the above attempts, security in distributed detection systems was incorporated
as an afterthought in that separate security blocks were added after the original system had
been designed without considering the possible security threats. Marano et al. in [36], on
the other hand, investigated the problem of designing optimal decision rules for a censoring
sensor network in the presence of eavesdroppers. Although their framework of censoring
sensor networks is more general, they assume that the Eve can only determine whether an
individual sensor transmits its decision or not. In reality, Eve can extract more information
than just merely determining the presence or absence of transmission, and hence can make
a reasonably good decision regarding the PoI, based on its receptions. Therefore, in this
chapter, we assume that the Eve is also interested in making similar inferences regarding
the PoI, just as in the case of FC.
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Figure 2.1: Distributed Inference Network in the Presence of an Eavesdropper
2.2 System Model
Consider a binary-hypothesis testing problem for distributed detection with N sensors un-
der the Neyman Pearson framework, as shown in Figure 2.1. Let ri = {ri,t : t = 1, · · · , T}
denote a sequence of i.i.d. observations (in time) acquired by the ith sensor over T time
periods. Furthermore, we also assume that these observations ri are independent across
sensors, i.e., for i = 1, · · · , N , but do not necessarily have identical distributions at differ-
ent sensors. Let H0 and H1 denote the null and the alternate hypotheses respectively. We
denote the conditional probability density functions of ri,t under hypotheses H0 and H1 as
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pi,0(r) = p(ri,t = r|H0) and pi,1(r) = p(ri,t = r|H1) respectively. In this chapter, for all
i = 1, · · · , N , we assume that the ith sensor employs binary quantization to compress its
observation ri,t into ui,t, as defined below, using a decision rule γi(·).
ui,t = γi(ri,t) =

1, where Λ(ri,t) ≥ λi
0, otherwise.
(2.1)
where Λ(ri,t) is a test-statistic and λi is a suitable threshold to be designed.
Let xi = P (ui,t = 1|H0) and yi = P (ui,t = 1|H1) denote the false-alarm and detection
probabilities at the ith sensor respectively. The pair (xi, yi) is traditionally referred to, as
the operating point of the ith sensor, which can lie anywhere on the compact1 unit-square
U = [0, 1]2, which we call the ROC space. For any fixed test-statistic Λ(·), when the
threshold λi is varied, the operating point of the ith sensor follows a curve yi = gΛ(xi).
This curve yi = gΛ(xi) is traditionally known as the ROC curve. In the rest of the chapter,
we use the operating point (xi, yi) to represent the quantizer rule γi employed at the ith
sensor. Two quantizers γ1 and γ2 are considered identical (equivalent), if their operating
points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are the same.
Let Γi denote the set of all feasible2 operating points (xi, yi) at the ith sensor. Then, the
region Γi in the ROC space is upper-bounded by the set of operating points corresponding
to the likelihood ratio tests (LRTs). We call this boundary as the LRT curve, and denote
it as yi = gLRTi(xi). Furthermore, we restrict our analysis only to those operating points
that lie above the line yi = xi in the ROC plane. This is because any point below the line
yi = xi contributes negatively to the overall performance in terms of error probability at
the FC. In summary, the region Γi in the ROC space is upper-bounded by the LRT curve
yi = gLRTi(xi), and lower-bounded by the line yi = xi.
1In this context, compactness of the unit-square corresponds to the inclusion of the boundary points (0,0),
(0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) within the set itself.
2The feasibility of an operating point is primarily dictated by the quality of the sensing observations. Note
that the size of Γi diminishes as the sensor observations get corrupted due to multipath fading and/or thermal
noise.
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Note that the operating points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the extreme points on the lower
boundary yi = xi. These operating points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are achieved by always deciding
ui,t = 0 and ui,t = 1 respectively. Since any operating point that lie on the line yi = xi can
be achieved via randomizing between the two operating points (0, 0) and (1, 1) (or, equiv-
alently the corresponding quantizer rules), we refer to this boundary as the uninformative
boundary (and, the corresponding quantizer rules and operating points as uninformative
rules and points respectively), since these rules do not depend on sensor observations.
Given the operating point (xi, yi), the Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence of the ith
sensor is defined as follows.
Di = xi log
xi
yi
+ (1− xi) log 1− xi
1− yi (2.2)
Let Υ = {0, 1}N denote theN -dimensional space of compressed symbolsut = {u1,t, · · · , uN,t}
at all the sensors at a given time t. In this chapter, we assume that the ith sensor transmits its
compressed symbols ui,t to the FC through a binary-symmetric channel (BSC) with transi-
tion probability ρfci . In our model, we also assume that an eavesdropper wiretaps each of
these sensor transmissions through a BSC with transition probability ρei .
If vi = {v1,t, · · · , vN,t} and wi = {w1,t, · · · , wN,t} denote the received symbols at the
FC and Eve respectively, the operating point (xi, yi) at the ith sensor gets transformed into
(xfci , yfci) and (xei , yei) at the FC and Eve respectively, which are given as follows.
xfci = P (vi,t = 1|H0) = ρfci + (1− 2ρfci)xi (2.3a)
yfci = P (vi,t = 1|H1) = ρfci + (1− 2ρfci)yi (2.3b)
xei = P (wi,t = 1|H0) = ρei + (1− 2ρei)xi (2.3c)
yei = P (wi,t = 1|H1) = ρei + (1− 2ρei)yi (2.3d)
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Let the contributions of the ith sensor to the overall KL Divergence at the FC and Eve
be denoted as DFCi and DEi respectively. Then, DFCi and DEi are defined as follows.
DFCi = xfci log
(
xfci
yfci
)
+ (1− xfci) log
(
1− xfci
1− yfci
)
DEi = xei log
(
xei
yei
)
+ (1− xei) log
(
1− xei
1− yei
)
.
(2.4)
Let A FCT ,A
E
T ∈ ΥT denote the acceptance regions of the hypothesis H1 at FC and
Eve respectively, over a time-window t = 1, · · · , T . Then, the global probabilities of false
alarm and miss at the FC and Eve are given by
pFCT = Pr(vi ∈ A FCT |H0), qFCT = Pr(vi ∈ A
FC
T |H1).
pET = Pr(wi ∈ A ET |H0), qET = Pr(wi ∈ A
E
T |H1).
(2.5)
where A
FC
T and A
E
T are the rejection regions of the hypothesis H1 at the FC and Eve re-
spectively, and, vi = {vi,1, · · · , vi,T} and wi = {wi,1, · · · , wi,T} are the received symbols
at the FC and Eve respectively, transmitted by the ith sensor over a time window of length
T . Next, we present Stein’s Lemma that addresses the asymptotic properties of the global
probability of miss qFCT .
Lemma 2.1 (Stein’s Lemma [16]). For any 0 < δ, ϕ < 1
2
, let qFCT,δ = min
pFCT <δ
qFCT and
qET,ϕ = min
pET<ϕ
qET . Then, we have
lim
δ→0
lim
T→∞
− 1
T
log qFCT,δ = DFC
lim
ϕ→0
lim
T→∞
− 1
T
log qET,ϕ = DE
(2.6)
where DFC and DE are the KL divergences at the FC and Eve respectively, which are
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defined as follows.
DFC =
N∑
i=1
DFCi and DE =
N∑
i=1
DEi . (2.7)
Thus, KL Divergence is the error exponent for the global probability of miss when
the global probability of false alarm is constrained (and diminishing to zero with time).
Therefore, as a surrogate to the global probability of miss, we choose KL Divergence as
the performance metric in this chapter. Note that DFC and DE are both convex functions
of x = {x1, · · · , xN} and y = {y1, · · · , yN} in the hyper-cube [0, 1]N , which is made up
of the ROC spaces of all the sensors in the detection network.
2.3 Linear Transformations in ROC Space
In this section, we focus our attention on the transformation of the operating point of a
single sensor due to the presence of a binary symmetric channel (BSC) between a given
sensor and both the FC, as well as between the same sensor and Eve. Let the operating
point of a given quantizer be A = (x, y). As mentioned earlier, the sensor’s quantizer
characteristics (x, y) are represented using its operating point in the sensor’s ROC. Also,
consider two BSCs with transition probabilities ρ1 and ρ2, each of which transforms the
operating point A = (x, y) into B1 = (x1, y1) and B2 = (x2, y2). Let C =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. In the
following lemma, we present a useful relationship between A, B1, B2 and C.
Lemma 2.2. Let 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 12 . Then, B1 and B2 always lie on the line segment joining
A and C. In addition, the following inequality holds true.
x
y
≤ x1
y1
≤ x2
y2
≤ 1 ≤ 1− x2
1− y2 ≤
1− x1
1− y1 ≤
1− x
1− y (2.8)
Proof. Consider a BSC with transition probability ρ, which transforms the operating point
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A = (x, y) into B = (xˆ, yˆ). Then, the equation of the line joining A and B is given by
b− y
a− x =
b− yˆ
a− xˆ (2.9)
where (a, b) is some arbitrary point on the line.
Substituting xˆ = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)x and yˆ = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)y, we have
b− y
a− x =
b− ρ− (1− 2ρ)y
a− ρ− (1− 2ρ)x. (2.10)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (2.10), we have
(b− y)[a− ρ− (1− 2ρ)x] = (a− x)[b− ρ− (1− 2ρ)y]. (2.11)
Simplifying Equation (2.11), we have
(a− b) + (y − x) = 2(ay − bx). (2.12)
Note that the line a = b represents the set of operating points for which the KL Diver-
gence becomes zero. Therefore, let us investigate the point where Equation (2.9) intersects
the line a = b. Substituting b = a, we have
(2a− 1)(y − x) = 0.
In other words, the line in Equation (2.9) intersects line a = b = 1
2
for any transition
probability ρ. In other words, the points A, B1, B2 and C are collinear.
In fact, as ρ → 1
2
, B → C. In other words, for a given sensor’s operating point A,
the transformed operating point B slides along the line segment joining A and C. This
sliding behavior can be investigated by analyzing the distance between B and C, in terms
of increasing ρ, as shown in Figure 2.2. We denote the Euclidian distance between B and
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C =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
B2 = (x2, y2)
B1 = (x1, y1)
A = (x, y)
Slope = yx
Slope = 1−y1−x
Slope = y1x1
Slope = 1−y11−x1
Slope = y2x2
Slope = 1−y21−x2
(0, 0)
(1, 1)
Figure 2.2: Transformations in the ROC
C as φBC =
√(
xˆ− 1
2
)2
+
(
yˆ − 1
2
)2. Differentiating φBC with respect to ρ, we have
dφBC
dρ
=
1
φBC
[(
xˆ− 1
2
)
(1− 2x) +
(
yˆ − 1
2
)
(1− 2y)
]
=
−1 + ρ+ (1− 2ρ)[x(1− x) + y(1− y)]
φBC
= −
(
ρ+ (1− 2ρ)[1− x(1− x)− y(1− y)]
φBC
)
≤ 0,
(2.13)
since the function x(1−x)+y(1−y) is concave and attains a maximum value of 1
2
at
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
.
In other words, B slides towards C as ρ increases. Consequently, as shown in Figure 2.2,
26
B1 is farther away from C than B2 on the line joining A and C, since 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1.
Note that the slope of the line joining (0, 0) and B1 is y1x1 , and similarly,
y2
x2
in the case
of B2. Since B2 is closer to B1 to C, as shown in Figure 2.2, y1x1 ≥
y2
x2
and the slope tends
to 1 as the transition probability approaches 1
2
. A similar argument holds for the slope of
the lines that join B1 and B2 with (1, 1). Therefore, the inequality given in Equation (2.8)
holds.
In order to understand the impact of this transformation on the performance of the
network, let us now analyze the KL Divergence at some arbitrary operating point B =
(xˆ, yˆ) due to a BSC with transition probability ρ operating on the sensor operating point A.
In the following lemma, we show that the KL Divergence decreases with increasing ρ.
Lemma 2.3. Given the sensor operating point A = (x, y), let B = (xˆ, yˆ) denote the
transformed operating point due to a BSC with transition probability ρ. Let DB denote the
KL Divergence at B. Then, for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
2
, DB is a monotonically decreasing function of ρ
whenever y ≥ x.
Proof. The KL Divergence at the transformed operating point B is defined as follows.
DB = xˆ log
xˆ
yˆ
+ (1− xˆ) log 1− xˆ
1− yˆ . (2.14)
Differentiating DB with respect to ρ, we have
dDB
dρ
= (1− 2y)
[
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
]
− (1− 2x)
[
log
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
)
− log
(
xˆ
yˆ
)]
=
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
)(1− 2y)− (1− 2x)

log
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
)
− log
(
xˆ
yˆ
)
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ


(2.15)
From Lemma 2.2, we have
xˆ
yˆ
≤ 1− xˆ
1− yˆ . (2.16)
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In other words,
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
≥ 0. Therefore, the sign of dDB
dρ
does not depend on
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
.
Also, using the properties of the log(·) function, we have
1− yˆ
1− xˆ ≤
log
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ
)
− log
(
xˆ
yˆ
)
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
≤ yˆ
xˆ
. (2.17)
Substituting Equation (2.17) in Equation (2.15), we have
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
)−1
dDB
dρ
≤ (1− 2y)− (1− 2x)
{
1− yˆ
1− xˆ
}
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
)−1
dDB
dρ
≤ −(y − x)
1− xˆ
(2.18)
Since
dDB
dρ
≤ 0, DB is a monotonically decreasing function of ρ, for all ρ ∈ [0, 12 ].
Having analyzed the impact of BSCs on the ROC, let us now shift our focus on finding
those quantizers that maximize the KL Divergence at the sensor or the FC. Given any
operating point A = (x, y) at the sensor, we investigate the behavior of DA with respect to
y, for a fixed value of x.
Lemma 2.4. The optimal quantizer always lies on the boundary of the set of all feasible
quantizer designs.
Proof. For a fixed value of x, we differentiate DA with respect to y as follows.
dDA
dy
∣∣∣∣
fixed x
=
1− x
1− y −
x
y
(2.19)
From Lemma 2.2, we have
dDA
dy
∣∣∣∣
fixed x
≥ 0. In other words, DA is a monotonically
increasing function of y, for a fixed value of x. Hence, we are always interested in quantizer
rules whose operating points lie on the boundary of the set of all feasible quantizers.
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In summary, the sensor operating point chosen on the LRT boundary slides towards the
point (1
2
, 1
2
) as the channel deteriorates (increasing ρ), which, in turn, degrades the KLD
of any decision rule γ to zero. Therefore, we address the problem of finding the operating
point on the boundary which maximizes DFC , where the boundary is dictated by the Eve’s
constraint DE = α and the boundary of Γ = {Γ1, · · · ,ΓN}.
2.4 Differential Secrecy
There exists a trade-off in the selection of binary sensor quantizers, as the loss in FC’s
performance is directly reflected in the performance loss at Eve. Therefore, in this section,
we model this design trade-off by considering the difference in the KLDs at the FC and Eve
as our performance metric. More specifically, we design sensor quantizers in a distributed
detection network that maximize the difference in the KLDs at the FC and Eve, as stated in
the following problem.
Problem 2.1. Determine the set of optimal operating points (x,y) ∈ Γ at all the sensors
that
maximize
(x,y)
DFC −DE
subject to (xi, yi) ∈ Γi, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Since the received symbols vi and wi at both the FC and Eve respectively, due to the
ith sensing agent are conditionally independent from those of other sensing agents, the
difference DFC − DE =
N∑
i=1
(DFC −DE) is linearly separable. Therefore, Problem 2.1
can be decomposed into N independent problems, which is stated below. For the sake of
notational convenience, we ignore the sensor indices in the remaining section.
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Problem 2.2. Determine the optimal sensor operating point (x, y) ∈ Γ that
maximize
(x,y)
DFC −DE
subject to (x, y) ∈ Γ.
We solve this problem in two different cases. In the first case, we assume that the Eve’s
channel is worse than FC’s channel. In other words, we assume that ρe ≥ ρfc. In the
second case, we assume that the Eve has a better channel than FC, i.e., ρe < ρfc.
CASE 1: Eve has worse channels than FC
In this case, we assume that ρe ≥ ρfc. Under this assumption, we show that the optimal
binary quantizers always lie on the LRT boundary of the achievable region, as shown in
Figure 2.3.
Lemma 2.5. For a fixed x, L(y) = DFC −DE is a monotonically increasing function of y
in the achievable region Γ, if the Eve has a worse channel than FC.
Proof. For a fixed x, we investigate the rate of change of L(y) = DFC −DE by taking its
derivative with respect to y, as follows.
dL(y)
dy
=
dDFC
dy
− dDE
dy
=
dyfc
dy
· dDFC
dyfc
− dye
dy
· dDE
dye
= (1− 2ρfc)
[
1− xfc
1− yfc −
xfc
yfc
]
− (1− 2ρe)
[
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
]
.
(2.20)
Given that ρe ≥ ρfc, we have 1 − 2ρfc ≥ 1 − 2ρe. Furthermore, given an operating
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Figure 2.3: L(y) increases with increasing y for a fixed value of x, when Eve has a worse
channel than FC.
point (x, y), as stated in Lemma 2.2, we have
1− xfc
1− yfc −
xfc
yfc
≥ 1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
. (2.21)
As a result, we have
dL
dy
≥ 0. (2.22)
Since L(y) is an increasing function of y for a given x, the optimal sensor operating
point always lies on the LRT boundary when the Eve has a worse channel than the FC.
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Figure 2.4: L(y) increases with decreasing y for a fixed value of x, when Eve has a better
channel than FC.
CASE 2: Eve has better channels than FC
Similar to Case 1, we now investigate the optimal sensor quantizers when Eve has a better
channel than the FC, i.e., when ρe < ρfc. We show that the optimal binary quantizers
always lie on the uninformative boundary of the achievable region (the line y = x), as
shown in Figure 2.4.
Lemma 2.6. For a fixed x, L(y) = DFC −DE is a monotonically decreasing function of y
in the achievable region Γ, if the Eve has a better channel than FC.
Proof. As shown in the proof of Lemma 2.5, we calculate the derivative of L(y) = DFC −
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DE with respect to y for a fixed x, as follows.
dL(y)
dy
= (1− 2ρfc)
[
1− xfc
1− yfc −
xfc
yfc
]
− (1− 2ρe)
[
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
]
. (2.23)
Given that ρe < ρfc, we have 1 − 2ρfc < 1 − 2ρe. Furthermore, given an operating
point (x, y), as stated in Lemma 2.2, we have
1− xfc
1− yfc −
xfc
yfc
<
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
. (2.24)
As a result, we have
dL
dy
< 0. (2.25)
Combining Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6, Problem 2.2 reduces to a quantizer selection problem,
as summarized below in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. The structure of an optimal sensor quantizer is LRT-based, if Eve has a
worse channel than the FC. Else, the optimal sensor quantizer is an uninformative rule.
Note that the objective considered in this section, namely the difference in KLDs at the
FC and Eve, does not constrain the Eve’s performance. Consequently, Eve may acquire an
intolerable amount of information from the sensors, and therefore, the solution (quantizer
design) provided in this section may not be attractive to the network designer in many
practical scenarios. Therefore, in the following section, we present another framework for
secrecy where we impose a tolerable constraint on the Eve’s performance in the design of
optimal binary quantizers at the sensors.
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2.5 Constrained Secrecy
In this section, we design a distributed detection network where DFC is maximized while
constraining DE to a prescribed tolerance limit, denoted as α. We present the formal prob-
lem statement and discuss the various scenarios that are addressed in this chapter, as fol-
lows.
Problem 2.3. Find
arg max
γ
DFC s.t.
1. DE ≤ α
2. (xi, yi) ∈ Γi, for all i = 1, · · · , N.
Note that Constraint 1 in the above problem statement becomes degenerate for large
values of α. More specifically, Problem 2.3 is meaningful only when 0 ≤ α < α∗ so that it
has a non-degenerate Constraint 1 in Problem 2.3. This critical value α∗ is equal to Eve’s
KL DivergenceD∗E , which Eve attains when FC attains the maximum KL DivergenceD
∗
FC .
This maximum KL Divergence D∗FC can be found by solving Problem 2.3 in the absence
of Constraint 1.
Let R , ∩Ni=1Γi ∩ { (x,y) | DE ≤ α } denote the search space in Problem 2.3. Note
that {(x,y) | DE ≤ α} is a convex level-set of DE [54], because DE is a convex function
of (x,y). Similarly, since LRTs are optimal in the absence of Eve (For a detailed proof,
please refer to Proposition 4.1 in [62]), Γi is also a convex set in the ROC space. Also, R
is an intersection of two convex sets, and therefore,R is a convex set.
Since DFC is a convex function of (x,y), Problem 2.3 is a convex maximization prob-
lem, and therefore, the optimal solution is one of the extreme points of R [54]. Note that
{(x,y) |DE ≤ α} is not necessarily a subset of Γi, and therefore, the optimal set of binary
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quantizers need not necessarily be LRTs. Furthermore, the search space R in Problem 2.3
is not a simple polytope. R is an intersection of two convex sets with smooth boundaries
and therefore, its boundary does not necessarily have a smooth differential at every point.
Consequently, optimal search algorithms proposed to solve traditional convex maximiza-
tion problems with polytope search spaces cannot be applied to find the optimal solution
of Problem 2.3, as our problem demands a more detailed analysis of the boundary of the
search space.
Therefore, in Section 2.5.1, we first restrict our attention to a simpler scenario3 where
all the sensors’ observations are identically distributed and, where all the channels between
the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the Eve) are identical. This
assumption results in the received symbols at the FC (likewise, received symbols at the
Eve) being conditionally i.i.d., thus decomposing the problem into a distributed framework
of N identical sub-problems. In Section 2.5.2, we consider a more general scenario4 where
the sensor observations are conditionally independent and non-identically distributed, and
the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and the
Eve) are also non-identical. In both these scenarios, we investigate the design of secure
binary quantizers when α < D∗E .
2.5.1 Identical Sensors and Channels
In this section, we address the problem of designing optimal quantizers when all the sensors
and the channels between the sensors and the FC (likewise, channels between sensors and
the Eve) are identical.
3In this chapter, we call this scenario as “identical sensors and channels".
4Similarly, we call this scenario as “non-identical sensors and channels".
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For all i = 1, · · · , N , we have
pi,0(x) = p0(x), pi,1(x) = p1(x)
xi = x, yi = y
ρfci = ρfc, ρei = ρe
(2.26)
Since all the sensors and their corresponding channels are identical, we remove the
sensor-indices for notational simplicity. Therefore, we have xfci = xfc, yfci = yfc, xei =
xe and yei = ye for all i = 1, · · · , N . Because of this, Di = D, DFCi = DFC and
DEi = DE for all i = 1, · · · , N , and consequently, the KLD at the FC and Eve reduces to
DFC = NDFC and DE = NDE . In other words, Problem 2.3 reduces to the design of the
quantizer at one of the identical sensors as follows.
Problem 2.4. Find
arg max
γ
DFC s.t.
1. DE ≤ α˜
2. (x, y) ∈ Γ.
where α˜ =
α
N
.
Note that, although Problem 2.4 is still a convex maximization problem, due to its re-
duced dimensionality, the problem becomes tractable. In the remaining section, we find the
optimal quantizer in two stages. First, we find the structure of the optimal binary quantiz-
ers by gaining insights into the behavior of DFC on the boundary of the Eve’s constraint
{(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}. Then, we present an algorithm to find the optimal threshold for this
quantizer.
We start our investigation of the behavior of DFC on the boundary of the Eve’s con-
straint {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜} by determining the necessary conditions for guaranteeing DE =
α˜ in the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.7. If the transition probability of the Eve’s BSCs satisfies ρe <
1
2
, the two nec-
essary conditions for any sensor operating point (x, y) to guarantee DE = α˜ in the ROC
space are stated as follows.
dy
dx
=
log
(
1− xe
1− ye
)
− log
(
xe
ye
)
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
(2.27)
and
(
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
)
d2y
dx2
= (1− 2ρe)
[
−
(
1− xe
(1− ye)2 +
xe
y2e
)(
dy
dx
)2
+2
(
1
ye
+
1
1− ye
)
dy
dx
−
(
1
xe
+
1
1− xe
)]
.
(2.28)
Proof. Since DE is a constant (equal to the fixed design-parameter α˜), its first two deriva-
tives are equal to zero. We employ these to prove the lemma.
First, we differentiate DE with respect to x and equate it to zero, as follows.
dDE
dx
=
d
dx
[
xe log
xe
ye
+ (1− xe) log
(
1− xe
1− ye
)]
= (1− 2ρe)
[(
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
)
dy
dx
−
{
log
(
1− xe
1− ye
)
− log
(
xe
ye
)}]
= 0.
(2.29)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (2.29), we can obtain Equation (2.27).
Next, we differentiate Equation (2.29) again with respect to x as follows, in order to
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find a closed-form expression for
d2y
dx2
.
d2DE
dx2
= (1− 2ρe) d
dx
[(
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
)
dy
dx
−
{
log
(
1− xe
1− ye
)
− log
(
xe
ye
)}]
= (1− 2ρe)
[(
1− xe
1− ye −
xe
ye
)
d2y
dx2
+ (1− 2ρe)
(
1− xe
(1− ye)2 +
xe
y2e
)(
dy
dx
)2
−2(1− 2ρe)
(
1
ye
+
1
1− ye
)
dy
dx
+ (1− 2ρe)
(
1
xe
+
1
1− xe
)]
.
= 0.
(2.30)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (2.30), we can obtain Equation (2.28).
Note that Equation (2.29) in Lemma 2.7 provides the slope of the Eve’s constraint
boundary DE = α˜. Since the slope of y with respect to x along the boundary DE = α˜ has
a structure similar to the slope of a line joining two points on a logarithmic curve as seen in
Equation (2.27), we present lower and upper bounds for the slope of this boundary curve
DE = α˜ in the ROC plane in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.8. The slope of the Eve’s constraint boundary in the ROC plane, as defined by
the set of points { (x, y) | DE = α˜ }, is bounded on both sides as follows.
xe
ye
≤ dy
dx
≤ 1− xe
1− ye . (2.31)
Proof. Given two points a ≥ b, due to the concavity of the log(·) function, the slope of the
line joining (a, log a) and (b, log b) always lies between the slopes of the log(·) at points a
and b respectively Hence, this results in Equation (2.31).
Note that the necessary conditions for any operating point (x, y) to lie on the Eve’s
constraint boundary { (x,y) | DE = α˜ }, as stated in Lemma 2.7, and the bounds on the
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slope of the same boundary curve, as given in Lemma 2.8, are essential to our analysis of
the behavior of the sensor’s KL divergence D, and the FC’s KL Divergence, DFC , in terms
of the false alarm probability x along the Eve’s constraint, which is defined by DE = α˜.
First, we investigate the behavior of the KL Divergence at the sensor, which is denoted
as D(x, y), along the Eve’s constraint DE(x, y) = α˜. Note that this analysis can be equiva-
lently interpreted as the case where we investigate the behavior of DFC when the channels
between the sensors and the FC are ideal. In the following proposition, we prove that
D(x, y) is a convex function of x along the curve DE(x, y) = α˜.
Proposition 2.1. Given that the Eve’s channel is a BSC with transition probability ρe < 12 ,
D is strictly a convex function of x, for all operating points that lie in the set {(x, y) |DE =
α˜}.
Proof. To show that D is a convex function of x in the presence of a constraint on Eve, we
investigate the second-order differential of D with respect to x.
The closed-form expression for the first-order differential of D with respect to x
dD
dx
=
d
dx
[
x log
x
y
+ (1− x) log
(
1− x
1− y
)]
=
(
1− x
1− y −
x
y
)
dy
dx
−
[
log
(
1− x
1− y
)
− log
(
x
y
)]
.
(2.32)
The second-order differential ofD can therefore be obtained by differentiating Equation
(2.32) with respect to x as follows.
d2D
dx2
=
(
1− x
1− y −
x
y
)
d2y
dx2
+
(
1− x
(1− y)2 +
x
y2
)(
dy
dx
)2
−2
(
1
y
+
1
1− y
)
dy
dx
+
(
1
x
+
1
1− x
)
.
(2.33)
Note that the first term in Equation (2.33) can be rewritten as follows.
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(
1− x
1− y −
x
y
)
d2y
dx2
=
(
1− x
1− y −
x
y
)
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
) (1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
)
d2y
dx2
=
yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y) ·
1
(1− 2ρ) ·
(
1− xˆ
1− yˆ −
xˆ
yˆ
)
d2y
dx2
(2.34)
Note that Equation (2.34) allows us to use the necessary condition for the operating
point (x, y) to lie on the Eve’s constraint curve DE = α˜, as given in Equation (2.28).
Therefore, we substitute Equation (2.28) from the Lemma 2.7 in Equation (2.34), and use
this in Equation (2.33) to have the following.
d2D
dx2
= T1
(
dy
dx
)2
− 2T2 dy
dx
+ T3 (2.35)
where
T1 =
(
1− x
(1− y)2 +
x
y2
)
− yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y)
(
1− xˆ
(1− yˆ)2 +
xˆ
yˆ2
)
(2.36a)
T2 =
(
1
y
+
1
(1− y)
)
− yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y)
(
1
yˆ
+
1
(1− yˆ)
)
(2.36b)
T3 =
(
1
x
+
1
(1− x)
)
− yˆ(1− yˆ)
y(1− y)
(
1
xˆ
+
1
(1− xˆ)
)
. (2.36c)
It is easy to show that T2 = 0.
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So, let us first consider T1. Expanding Equation (2.36a), we have
T1 =
(xyˆ − xˆy)− (xyˆ2 − xˆy2) + yyˆ {(y − yˆ)− 2(x− xˆ) + 2(xyˆ − xˆy)}
y2(1− y)2yˆ(1− yˆ)
=
−ρ(y − x)− {ρ2x− ρy2 + 2ρ(1− 2ρ)xy − 2ρ(1− 2ρ)xy2}+ yyˆ(ρ− 2ρx)
y2(1− y)2yˆ(1− yˆ)
=
ρ(1− ρ)(y − x)(2y − 1)
y2(1− y)2yˆ(1− yˆ)
(2.37)
Similarly, expanding Equation 2.36c for T3, we have
T3 =
1
y(1− y)
[
y(1− y)
x(1− x) −
yˆ(1− yˆ)
xˆ(1− xˆ)
]
=
ρ(1− ρ)
y(1− y) ·
(y − x)(1− x− y)
x(1− x)xˆ(1− xˆ)
(2.38)
Substituting Equations (2.37) and (2.38) in Equation (2.35), we simplify Equation
(2.35) into the following.
d2D
dx2
=
ρ(1− ρ)(y − x)
y(1− y) · T4 (2.39)
where
T4 =
2y − 1
yyˆ(1− y)(1− yˆ)
(
dy
dx
)2
+
1− x− y
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ) . (2.40)
Note that, if T4 ≥ 0, D is a convex function of x along the Eve’s constraint curve
DE = α˜. Since we are only interested in the region where y ≥ x and ρ < 1
2
for all
practical purposes, we restrict our analysis of the sign of T4 in this region.
In order to analyze the sign of T4, we divide the achievable region in the receiver-
operating characteristics into three regions, as shown in Figure 2.5.
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y
y
y =
1
2
x + y = 1R1
R2
R3
y = x
1
1
Figure 2.5: Partition of ROC into three regions
R1 :
(
y ≤ 1
2
)
& (x+ y ≤ 1)
R2 :
(
y ≥ 1
2
)
& (x+ y ≤ 1)
R3 :
(
y ≥ 1
2
)
& (x+ y ≥ 1) .
(2.41)
Obviously, in region R2, 2y − 1 ≥ 0 and 1 − x − y ≥ 0. Therefore, d
2D
dx2
≥ 0.
Henceforth, we analyze the sign of T4 in the remaining regionsR1 andR3.
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Region R1 In this region, 2y − 1 ≤ 0. Therefore, we use the upper bound on dy
dx
,
presented in Equation (2.31), to find the sign of T4 as follows.
Substituting Equation (2.31) in Equation (2.40), we have
T4 ≥ 1− x− y
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ) −
1− 2y
yyˆ(1− y)(1− yˆ)
yyˆ
xxˆ
=
1
xxˆ
[
1− x− y
(1− x)(1− xˆ) −
1− 2y
(1− y)(1− yˆ)
]
=
(1− x− y)(1− y)(1− yˆ)− (1− y)(1− x)(1− xˆ) + y(1− x)(1− xˆ)
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ)
(2.42)
Equation (2.42) can be rearranged as follows.
T4 ≥ (y − x) [y(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ) {(2y − 1)(1− x)− y
2}]
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ) (2.43)
Since 1 − x − y ≥ 0 in region R1, we have 1 − x ≥ y. Therefore, substituting this
inequality in Equation (2.43), we have
T4 ≥ (y − x) [y(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ) {(2y − 1)y − y
2}]
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ)
=
(y − x) [y(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)y(y − 1)]
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ)
=
(y − x)y [(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)(y − 1)]
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ)
=
(y − x)yyˆ
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)(1− y)(1− yˆ)
≥ 0.
(2.44)
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Region R3 In this region, since 2y − 1 ≥ 0, we use the lower bound on dy
dx
, presented
in Equation (2.31), in order to find the sign of T4.
Substituting Equation (2.31) in Equation (2.40), we have
T4 ≥ 2y − 1
yyˆ(1− y)(1− yˆ)
(1− y)(1− yˆ)
(1− x)(1− xˆ) −
x+ y − 1
xxˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)
=
1
(1− x)(1− xˆ)
[
2y − 1
yyˆ
− x+ y − 1
xxˆ
]
.
=
(yyˆ − xxˆ)− y(yyˆ − xxˆ)− xy(yˆ − xˆ)
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)
=
(1− y) {ρ(y − x) + (1− 2ρ)(y2 − x2)} − xy(1− 2ρ)(y − x)
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)
=
(y − x) {ρ(1− y) + (1− 2ρ)y(1− y)− (1− 2ρ)x(1− 2y)}
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)
(2.45)
Since we are only interested in the region where y ≥ x, Equation (2.46) can be lower-
bounded as follows.
T4 ≥ 1
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ) [(y − x) {ρ(1− y)
+(1− 2ρ)x(1− y)− (1− 2ρ)x(1− 2y)}]
=
(y − x) [ρ(1− y) + (1− 2ρ)xy]
xxˆyyˆ(1− x)(1− xˆ)
≥ 0.
(2.46)
Hence, for BSCs with ρ < 1
2
, D is a convex function of x along the constraint DE =
α.
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For any general BSC between the sensors and the FC, the sensor’s operating point (x, y)
transforms linearly into (xfc, yfc). Consequently, we have the following proposition, where
we analyze the behavior of DFC for any general BSC.
Proposition 2.2. Let the BSCs corresponding to the FC and Eve have transition probabil-
ities 0 < ρfc, ρe < 12 . Then, DFC is strictly a convex function of x, for all operating points
that lie in the set {(x, y) | DE = α˜}.
Proof. Note that (xfc, yfc) is a linear transformation of (x, y). This can be mathematically
expressed as follows.
 xfc
yfc
 = ρfc
 1
1
+ (1− 2ρfc)
 x
y
 . (2.47)
In other words, a composition of D with an affine transformation, as given in Equation
(2.47), results in DFC . Consequently, since D is a convex function, DFC is also a convex
function [10].
Thus, for any BSC with transition probability ρfc corresponding to the FC, DFC is a
convex function of x. In other words, among the set of operating points that lie on the
Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜, the quantizers that maximize DFC always lie on the
intersection of the LRT curve y = gLRT (x) and the Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜.
As a consequence, the optimal quantizer is LRT-based, which we state in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.2. The optimal quantizer that maximizes the FC’s KL Divergence DFC in the
presence of a constraint on Eve’s KL Divergence DE = α˜ is a likelihood ratio quantizer.
Proof. Let Ri , Γi ∪ {(x, y) | DE = α˜} denote the search space in Problem 2.4. We
know, from Proposition 2.1, that DFC is convex with respect to x along the Eve’s con-
straint boundary on the ROC plane. Therefore, the solution of Problem 2.4 always lies
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on the extreme points of the set of operating points on the Eve’s constraint boundary
{(x, y) | DE = α˜}. Note that the region of the Eve’s constraint boundary that lies within
Ri depends on the choice of α˜.
Let D∗E be the maximum KL Divergence at the Eve when the sensor employs the opti-
mal solution to the unconstrained problem where Constraint 1 is not considered in Problem
2.4. In the regard, the following two cases arise:
• Case-1 [ α˜ ≥ D∗E ]: Note that, Γi ⊆ {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜} in this case because the
Eve’s KL Divergence is always within the tolerable limit when the sensor employs
any operating point (x, y) ∈ Γi. Therefore, the solution to Problem 2.4 is the optimal
LRT in this case [62].
• Case-2 [ α˜ ≤ D∗E ]: This is equivalent to the case where Γi * {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}.
Note that we also have Γi 6⊃ {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜} since there always exist operat-
ing points (x, y) ∈ Γi such that DE ≤ α˜. Therefore, the boundaries of Γi and
{(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜} both intersect each other. As discussed earlier in this proof, since
the optimal solution is an extreme point of the Eve’s constraint boundary DE = α˜,
this is one of the intersection points that also lies on the boundary of Γi. In other
words, the optimal sensor quantizer that solves Problem 2.4 is a LRT.
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 2.2, the problem of finding the optimal quantizer
reduces to the problem of finding the intersection points of the boundaries of Γi and the
Eve’s constraint {(x, y) | DE ≤ α˜}, and thereby, finding the corresponding threshold for
the optimal LRT at the sensor.
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Algorithm to find the Optimal Threshold
Let f(x) , DFC(x, y = gLRT (x)). For the sake of tractability, we consider the problem
of finding optimal thresholds when f(x) is a quasi-concave5 function of x. As shown in
Proposition 2.1, since the Eve’s constraint translates into the convexity ofDFC with respect
to x, there are at most two points of intersection for the curves y = gLRT (x) and DE = α˜,
of which, one of them corresponds to the optimal quantizer. We present this formally in the
following claim.
Claim 2.1. Let f(x) , DFC(x, y = gLRT (x)). If f(x) is a quasi-concave function of x,
then there are at most two intersection points for the curves y = gLRT (x) and DE = α˜.
The optimal quantizer corresponds to one of the two intersection points.
Therefore, the problem reduces to finding these two intersection points and comparing
them with respect to each other in terms of their respective DFC . Moreover, we wish to
find the threshold λ∗ for the LRT that maximizes DFC in the presence of Eve’s constraint.
Since, both x and y are tail-probabilities where the start of the tail is the threshold, x and
y are both monotonically decreasing functions of the threshold λ. Therefore, we have the
following claim.
Claim 2.2. The two intersection points can be found by investigating the zeros of the func-
tion h(λ) , DE(x(λ), y(λ)) − α˜, where x and y are parameterized by the LRT threshold
λ.
Let α˜max denote the value of KL Divergence at which DE reaches its maximum value.
In other words, the optimal quantizer in the absence of Eve (equivalent to α˜ =∞), denoted
as the operating point (x∞, y∞), is the same as the optimal quantizer for any α˜ ≥ α˜max.
5Note that
lim
x→0
f(x) = 0, lim
x→1
f(x) = 0 (2.48)
Since, KLD is always non-negative, we always have f(x) ≥ 0. Also, since any LRT curve y = gLRT (x)
cuts through the level-sets of DFC and is concave, f(x) is a quasi-concave function of x.
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Obviously, the function h(λ) has two real zeros only when α˜ < α˜max. Note that only one
of them provides the maximum KL Divergence at the FC.
In order to find both zeros of the function h(λ) = 0, we use the bisection method where
we first find the point λ∗ at which h(λ) attains its maximum value. Then, consider two
points, one on either side of λ∗ (which are at a significant distance from λ∗) as initial points
and use the bisection algorithm to find the roots of h(λ) = 0. We call these two zeros
as λ1 and λ2. Then, we compute and compare DFC at the operating points (x(λ1), y(λ1))
and (x(λ2), y(λ2)). We choose that threshold as the optimal choice, which results in the
maximum DFC .
For the sake of illustration, we present an example where the sensors observe the pres-
ence or absence of a known deterministic signal, which is corrupted by additive Gaussian
noise.
Illustrative Example
We have so far shown that the optimal quantizer lies at the intersection of the curves
DE = α˜ and the LRT boundary in the ROC. But, the structure of the LRT is specific to the
observation model, and therefore, it is difficult to characterize the optimal sensor quantizer,
in general. Therefore, we illustrate the design methodology for an example, where the sen-
sors observe the presence or absence of a known deterministic signal. In other words, the
observations at the ith sensor are modeled as follows.
ri,t =

ni,t if H0
θ + ni,t if H1
(2.49)
where θ is the signal-of-interest and ni,t ∼ N (0, σ2) is the additive Gaussian noise with
zero mean and variance σ2. Then, the probabilities of false alarm and detection are given
by
x = Q
(
λ
σ
)
, y = Q
(
λ− θ
σ
)
(2.50)
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where Q(·) is the tail probability of the standard normal distributionN (0, 1).
Substituting Equation (2.50) in Equation (2.2), we obtain the KL Divergence at the
sensor, which is observed to be concave for this example. Therefore, as stated in Claim
2.1, the optimum quantizer is given by the intersection of the LRT boundary in the ROC
with the Eve’s constraint DE = α˜.
Note that Equation (2.50) is a parameterization of the LRT boundary, where both the
ROC’s coordinates are parameterized with the threshold of the LRT. Since we are interested
in the intersection of the LRT’s boundary in the ROC with the Eve’s constraint DE = α˜,
we substitute xe = ρe + (1 − 2ρe)Q
(
λ
σ
)
and ye = ρe + (1 − 2ρe)Q
(
λ− θ
σ
)
in DE to
obtain h(λ) = DE(x(λ), y(λ))− α˜.
As shown in Figure 2.6, h(λ) is a quasi-concave function of λ, with the tails converging
to −α˜. In other words, there are at most two zero-crossings since the function h(λ) is
unimodal with the two tails converging to a value less than zero. Therefore, there are at
most two solutions to the equation h(λ) = 0. The optimum sensor threshold can be found
by investigating the two zeros of h(λ), as suggested in Claim 2.2, and comparing them in
terms of DFC .
Discussion and Results
In this subsection, we first discuss the impact of the secrecy constraint on the performance
of the sensor network. Obviously, when we consider α˜ = 0, the network achieves perfect
secrecy. But, this also forces the network to be blind in that DFC → 0. On the other
extreme, consider a scenario where α˜ → ∞. This is equivalent to the case where there is
no eavesdropper present in the network. In other words, the optimal quantizer is given by
(x∞, y∞). For any finite α˜ > 0, we numerically investigate the tradeoff between secrecy
and performance of a given distributed detection system.
Since α˜ is the tolerable limit on the performance of Eve, the greater the information
leakage we can tolerate, the better the performance of the distributed detection network.
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Figure 2.6: Plot of h(λ) as a function of λ
This tradeoff is captured by Figure 2.7, where the maximum DFC in the presence of a
constrained Eve increases with increasing α˜. Note that, beyond a certain value of α˜, the
maximum DFC gets saturated to the optimal KLD at the FC in the absence of Eve. This
saturation level for this example is 5.8 and it is dictated by the fundamental limits enforced
by the imperfect observations and channel models within the network.
Next, we demonstrate the impact of the Eve’s constraint on the ROC, as well as the KL
Divergence at the FC, in Figure 2.8, when the FC’s channels are ideal (ρfc = 0). Note
that this argument can be carried over to any general BSC at the FC, as the operating point
(xfc, yfc) is a linear transformation of (x, y). In Figure 2.8, we assume ρe = 0.1 and
consider two different values of α˜. In Figure 2.8a, we plot the constraint curve DE = α˜
along with the sensor’s ROC. Note that the constraint curve intersects the LRT curve at
two distinct points, as stated earlier. One of these two intersection points (the intersection
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point to the right, in this example) is optimal, as shown in Figure 2.8b. Note that the
skewness in the ellipses in Figure 2.8b is due to the asymmetry in the KL divergence.
Also, as α˜ decreases, DFC becomes deeper and flat-bottomed as a function of x over the
Eve’s constraint curve DE = α˜. Another important observation to be made is the fact
that the optimal solution in the presence and absence of Eve (red curves) always is on the
boundary of the LRT curve, although the thresholds vary depending on the scenario. Since
the sufficient test-statistic is the same irrespective of the presence or absence of Eve, the
network designer may implement the system in terms of a threshold that can be varied.
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In practice, there exist many conditional probability distributions p0(r) and p1(r) for
which the computation of likelihood-ratios is intractable. Also, there may be situations
where these distributions are not even known to the network designer. In both these cases,
the network designer may choose to employ a tractable test that is not LRT.
Let Λ be the test-statistic employed in the sensor quantizer γ, as defined in Equation
(2.1). Note that, by allowing randomization (linear stochastic combination of operating
points) between quantizers, Carathèodary’s theorem [54] and Lemma 2.2 in Section 2.3
together makes every operating point (x, y) inside the set Ψ , conv ({(x, y) | y ≤ gΛ(x)})
feasible, where conv(S ) represents the convex-hull of a given setS .
Since Ψi is convex, all of our arguments presented in Section 2.5.1 also hold for the
case of any general non-LRT quantizer. We summarize this in the following claim:
Claim 2.3. Given any ROC curve y = gΛ(x) based on a test-statistic Λ, the optimal quan-
tizer that maximizes the FC’s KL Divergence DFC in the presence of a constraint on Eve’s
KL Divergence DE = α˜ within the set Ψ˜i , conv{(x, y) | y ≤ gΛ(x)} always lies on the
boundary of Ψ˜i.
As discussed earlier in this subsection, this optimal operating point can be implemented
by randomizing over a finite set of quantizers, all defined using the same test statistic Λ.
2.5.2 Non-Identical Sensors and Channels
In Section 2.5.1, we investigated the case of identical sensors and channels which was sim-
ilar to the case of designing the quantizer at a single sensor. In this section, we investigate
Problem 2.3 when the network has non-identical sensors and/or has non-identical chan-
nels. Since Problem 2.3 is NP-Hard in general, we propose an efficient methodology for
quantizer design that satisfies the Eve’s constraint DE ≤ α.
Note that the objective functionDFC is linearly separable since the sensor observations
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are conditionally independent. Therefore, we define
Φn = Φn−1 +DFCn , ∀ n = 2, · · · , N. (2.51)
where Φ1 = DFC1 . If, at any given intermediate stage, if Φn−1 is a constant, then the
problem of maximizing Ψn reduces to the problem of maximizing DFCn .
This above property of KL Divergence at the FC motivates us to employ dynamic pro-
gramming [8] to decompose Problem 2.3 into N sub-problems by breaking down the Eve’s
constraint parameter α into α = {α1, · · · , αN} using a greedy algorithm. Here, for the
sake of ensuring the feasibility of our solution, we assume the following.
N∑
i=1
αi ≤ α.
Therefore, for a given α, Problem 2.3 becomes:
Problem 2.5. For every i = 1, · · · , N , find
arg max
γ
DFCi s.t.
1. DEi ≤ αi
2. (xi, yi) ∈ Γi, for all i = 1, · · · , N.
Note that the performance of this proposed design-methodology completely depends
on the choice of α = {α1, · · · , αN}. To be more precise, the exact solution to Prob-
lem 2.3 can be equivalently expressed in terms of an optimal decomposition of α into
α = {α1, · · · , αN}. Since the problem of finding optimal α is intractable, we present a
suboptimal (greedy) algorithm to find an efficient decomposition of α as follows.
Let D∗FCi denote the maximum KL Divergence achievable at the FC, due to the i
th sen-
sor. In such a setting, Eve attains a KL Divergence D∗Ei due to the i
th sensor. We define the
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quality6 of the FC’s and the Eve’s channels corresponding to the ith sensor as ki =
D∗FCi
D∗Ei
.
The quality ki represents the tradeoff between the detection performance and secrecy. Let
the sensors be ordered in terms of the increasing quality as ki1 ≥ · · · ≥ kiN . In other
words, we obtain the best tradeoff in terms of the sensor quality by considering sensors
in the order of decreasing quality in our sequential allocation mechanism. Therefore, we
propose a greedy decomposition of Problem 2.5 into N sequential problems based on the
sensors’ quality, where α = {α1, · · · , αN} is chosen such that DFC is maximized in the
presence of Eve’s constraint DE ≤ α. Note that this decoupling of α into α allows us to
solve each of the individual problems in Problem 2.5 using the same method as presented
in Section 2.5.1.
Having ordered the nodes in terms of decreasing k∗i , we know that node i achieves better
tradeoff than node j, if i > j. This allows us to select nodes with lower indices to achieve
the best tradeoffs between detection performance and secrecy until the resource (constraint
on Eve, α) is completely utilized. Therefore, the decomposition of DFC , as shown in
Equation (2.51), allows us to sequentially select the individual sensors in an increasing
order of indices. Therefore, for index i = 1, we allocate α1 = D∗E1 if α ≥ D∗E1 . Otherwise,
α1 = α. Having allocated the Eve’s constraint to Sensor 1, we move to Sensor 2. Now, the
remaining tolerable leakage information at the Eve is given by [α−D∗E1 ]+, where [x]+ = x
if x ≥ 0, or, 0 otherwise. Therefore, we solve the problem at Sensor 2 with a new constraint
[α−D∗E1 ]+.
As the process of selecting the nodes progresses, we reach a point where N∗ sensors
are already selected and the remaining resource left, given by α −
N∗∑
i=1
D∗Ei , is less than
DEN∗+1 . Therefore, we let αN∗+1 = α −
N∗∑
i=1
D∗Ei and let the remaining sensors sleep in
order to satisfy the secrecy constraint.
6Note that this definition for ki is one possible heuristic. Another potential heuristic is to define ki as the
difference D∗FCi −D∗Ei , for which we will investigate the network performance in our future work.
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Numerical Results
In order to illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we consider a simple ex-
ample where, for each i = 1, · · · , N , the ith sensor’s observation followsN (0, σ2) under
hypothesis H0 and N (µi, σ2) under hypothesis H1. Note that this example demonstrates
a scenario where the signal source is spaced at different distances from different sensors in
the network, and the sensor observations are modelled using a path-loss attenuation chan-
nel model. In such a case, the detection probability at the ith sensor can be defined as
yi = Q (Q
−1(x)− ηi) in terms of the false alarm probability xi, where ηi = µiσ is the cor-
responding SNR. Assuming that the FC has a perfect channel (ρfci = 0), while the Eve has
a binary symmetric channel with transition probability ρei = ρi at the i
th sensor, we have
xfci = xi, yfci = yi, xei = ρi + (1 − 2ρi)xi and yei = ρi + (1 − 2ρi)yi. Then, the KL
divergences at the FC and Eve are computed as shown in Equation (2.7).
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Figure 2.9: Performance of the Proposed Greedy Algorithm in a Distributed Inference Network when α = 50.
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For the sake of illustration, we consider a specific example in order to demonstrate the
performance of the proposed greedy algorithm. We assume that all the sensors have identi-
cal sensing channels by letting ηi = 1, for all i = 1, · · · , N . The transition probabilities of
the BSCs between the sensors and the FC are sampled randomly from a uniform distribu-
tion U (0, 0.01). Similarly, we let the Eve’s channels’ transition probabilities be sampled
randomly from a uniform distributionU (0, 0.1). We present a single run of our simulation
results in Figure 2.9, where we present both the KL Divergence at the FC and Eve, along
with the number of sensors selected in the network, as a function of N when α = 50.
Note that, for α = 50, the difference between the KL divergences between the FC and Eve
is about 40 units. We also provide an upper bound on this difference using a benchmark
comparison where we present the case where the FC has ideal channels. In the case where
FC has ideal channels, the KL Divergences at the FC and Eve are denoted as D˜FC and
D˜E respectively. Although the FC’s KL divergence is always lower-bounded by Eve’s KL
divergence, the difference in the KL Divergences at the FC and Eve depend on the quality
of the channels at both FC and Eve.
Also, note that, in Figure 2.9a, as the number of sensors increases, both DFC and DE
monotonically increase until N reaches a critical point whereDE = α. Beyond this critical
point, the algorithm starts to select only those sensors that are prioritized according to
the decreasing order of ki. Furthermore, in Figure 2.9b, the number of selected sensors
increases with increasing number of sensors in the network at the similar rate as that of
DFC . Lastly, note that the performance of the distributed inference network in terms of KL
Divergence saturates as N increases as per intuition.
2.6 Summary
In summary, we have considered two secrecy frameworks, namely differential and con-
strained secrecy, in a distributed detection network when all the communication channels
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are binary symmetric channels. In the case of differential secrecy, we have shown that the
structure of optimal quantizer at any sensor is either LRT-based, or uninformative. In the
case of constrained secrecy, we have proved that the optimal quantizer is always LRT-based
in the presence of identical sensors and channels. We have presented an algorithm to find
optimal LRT thresholds, and presented numerical results to illustrate the performance of
our network design. In the case of non-identical sensors and channels, we have proposed
an efficient design for sensor quantizers by decomposing the original problem in N sub-
problems using a dynamic programming approach. Numerical results have been presented
to illustrate the efficiency of our proposed design under different scenarios.
59
CHAPTER 3
SECRECY IN CENTRALIZED
DETECTION: TRANSMIT-DIVERSITY
Security in detection networks is a well-studied research topic in the past literature, in
which several mitigation techniques such as stochastic encryption, optimal design of local
detectors and so on, have been proposed to mitigate information leakage to eavesdrop-
pers. While secrecy has been addressed in distributed detection networks in the past, as
discussed in Chapter 2, the problem still remains open in the context of centralized detec-
tion networks. In this chapter, we consider the problem of designing a secure centralized
detection network in the presence of tolerable secrecy constraints in this chapter.
We propose a transmit-diversity mechanism in a centralized detection network where
the sensors construct transmission signals by combining artificial noise with the amplified
observation so as to maximize the KL Divergence at the FC in the presence of a tolerable
constraint on Eve’s KL Divergence. While the amplify-forward mechanism is designed to
increase the detection performance at the FC, the artificial noise is chosen in such a way
that the Eve’s performance is severely affected. In this chapter, we derive efficient sensor
transmission policies in the proposed framework for detection networks by solving a non-
convex optimization problem approximately using a two-stage algorithm. In the first stage,
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our proposed algorithm decomposes the original problem intoN sub-problems, whereN is
the number of sensing units in the network. In the second stage, each sub-problem is solved
by relaxing it into a semidefinite program (SDP). In our simulation results, we show that the
FC’s KL Divergence increases as the number of sensor antennas increases. Furthermore,
with enough number of sensor antennas, we show that the FC can always attain a greater
KL Divergence than that of Eve by employing our proposed approach.
3.1 Literature Survey
Transmit-diversity mechanisms in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems have
gained a lot of attention of many researchers over the last decade in the context of physical-
layer security of communication systems. For a detailed account on this literature, the
reader may refer to [40] for an in-depth survey on MIMO communication, and [28, 30]
for an in-depth survey on MIMO detection. In this vast literature on MIMO systems,
the most relevant framework to this work is the design of secure relay networks1 with
MIMO/beamforming capabilities, which are surveyed in great detail in [40], [70] and [19].
In these works, communication metrics such as Shannon’s equivocation rate were chosen
as design-objectives.
In contrast to securing relay networks and other communication networks using tradi-
tional MIMO/beamforming methods, we design an optimal transmission mechanism over
multiple antennas at the sensors that employ amplify-and-forward transmission of obser-
vations, while simultaneously injecting artificial noise at the sensors in order to reduce
information-leakage to the Eve. This work is inspired by the work carried out by Goel and
Negi in [18, 45], where they proposed a MIMO-based scheme for point-to-point commu-
nication links to mitigate information-transfer to the Eve by adding artificial noise in the
nulls of the beam.
1Relay networks are similar to parallel-topology detection networks in terms of their functioning and
architecture, which are traditionally designed to optimize Shannon’s information rate between the end-users.
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3.2 System Model and Problem Statement
Consider a detection network of N sensors, as shown in Figure 3.1, communicating with
the FC through a parallel-topology of wireless links. Let the binary hypotheses H1 and H0
denote the presence and absence of a phenomenon-of-interest (PoI), with prior probabilities
pi1 and pi0 respectively. Let ri be the observation made by the ith sensor, whose signal model
is given as follows.
ri =

ni; under H0
θ + ni; under H1
(3.1)
where ni is a zero-mean AWGN noise with variance σ2s , and θ is a known real-valued PoI
signal, i.e., θ ∈ R.
Let each sensor be equipped with a transmitting array of L antennas, while the FC
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receives each of the sensor’s transmissions using a single antenna for each parallel channel.
The ith sensor processes the received signal ri and generates si = [si1, · · · , siL], and each
signal sik is transmitted through the kth antenna respectively, and is chosen as follows.
sik = rixik + wik (3.2)
where xik is the weight of the ith sensor’s observation ri at the kth antenna, and wik ∼
N (0, y2ik) is the artificial noise added independently to the k
th antenna at the ith sensor. In
other words, yik is the root-mean square (RMS) power of the artificial noise wik.
Equation (3.2) can be written in a vector form, as follows:
si = rixi + wi (3.3)
where si, xi and wi are L× 1 vectors for all i = 1, · · · , N .
In this chapter, we assume that the ith sensor transmits the signals si in one-shot us-
ing all its L transmitting antennas. In practice, a sensing unit has a limited total energy
available for its transmission. This constraint on the total energy consumed to transmit
si = {si1, · · · , siL} at the ith sensor is given as follows.
E
(
sTi si
) ≤ E . (3.4)
Expanding and simplifying Equation (3.4), we have
(
σ2s + pi1θ
2
)
xTi xi + y
T
i yi ≤ E (3.5)
The sensors transmit their respective messages over N dedicated orthogonal channels,
such that the FC and Eve receive N signals (one antenna per channel), which are denoted
as {rfc1 , · · · , rfcN} and {re1 , · · · , reN} respectively. We model these received signals at
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the FC and Eve respectively, as follows.
rfci =
L∑
k=1
hiksik + nfci , (3.6a)
rei =
L∑
k=1
giksik + nei , (3.6b)
where hik and gik are the channel-gains between the kth antenna at the ith sensor and the
ith receiving antenna at the FC and Eve respectively, and, nfci ∼ N (0, σ2fc) and nei ∼
N (0, σ2e) are AWGN noises at the FC and Eve respectively.
For the sake of notational simplicity, let hi = {hi1, · · · , hiL} and gi = {gi1, · · · , giL}
denote the channel-gain vectors at the FC and Eve respectively, corresponding to the ith
sensor. Let IN denote a N × N identity matrix. Then, Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) can be
rewritten as
rfc = R

hT1 x1
...
hTNxN
+

hT1 w1
...
hT1 w1
+ nfc (3.7a)
re = R

gT1 x1
...
gTNxN
+

gT1 w1
...
gTNwN
+ ne (3.7b)
where R is a N × N diagonal matrix with ri being the ith diagonal entry, and, nfc ∼
N (0, σ2fcIN) and ne ∼ N (0, σ2e IN) are additive noise vectors at the FC and Eve respec-
tively. Being linear combinations of conditionally normal random variables, both rfc and re
are also normally distributed when conditioned under any given hypothesis. More specifi-
cally, we have
rfc|H0 ∼ N (0,Σfc), rfc|H1 ∼ N (µfc,Σfc),
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and
re|H0 ∼ N (0,Σe), re|H1 ∼ N (µe,Σe),
where µfc, µe, Σfc and Σe are computed as follows.
µfc = E(rfc|H1) = θ

hT1 x1
...
hTNxN
 , (3.8a)
µe = E(re|H1) = θ

gT1 x1
...
gTNxN
 , (3.8b)
Σfc = E[rfcr
T
fc|H0] = E[(rfc − µfc)(rfc − µfc)T |H1]
= σ2s

xT1H11x1 · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 · · · xTNHN1xN

+

yT1 H12y1 · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 · · · yTNHN2yN
+ σ2fcI,
(3.8c)
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and
Σe = E[rfcr
T
fc|H0] = E[(rfc − µfc)(rfc − µfc)T |H1]
= σ2s

xT1G11x1 · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 · · · xTNGN1xN

+

yT1 G12y1 · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 · · · yTNGN2yN
+ σ2e I.
(3.8d)
where, for all i = 1, · · · , N ,
Hi1 = hih
T
i , Gi1 = hih
T
i
Hi2 = [diag(hi)]
2 , Gi2 = [diag(gi)]
2 .
(3.9)
In this chapter, we choose KL Divergence as the performance metric at both FC and
Eve, denoted by Dfc and De at the FC and Eve respectively, for the sake of tractability.
Note that KL Divergence is the error exponent for the global miss probability in the Ney-
man Pearson framework, where the global false alarm probability is constrained to a fixed
tolerable amount. Therefore, Dfc and De act as a surrogate to the global error probability
at both the FC and Eve respectively.
We compute bothDfc andDe of the received signals rfc and re respectively, as follows.
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Dfc = EH0
[
log
p(rfc|H0)
p(rfc|H1)
]
=
1
2
µTfcΣ
−1
fc µfc
=
θ2
2
N∑
i=1
[
xTi Hi1xi
σ2sx
T
i Hi1xi + y
T
i Hi2yi + σ
2
fc
]
(3.10a)
De = EH0
[
log
p(re|H0)
p(re|H1)
]
=
1
2
µTe Σ
−1
e µe
=
θ2
2
N∑
i=1
[
xTi Gi1xi
σ2sx
T
i Gi1xi + y
T
i Gi2yi + σ
2
fc
]
(3.10b)
Our goal is to design a secure detection network that maximizes the KL Divergence at
the FC, while constraining the Eve’s KL Divergence to a fixed value α, in the presence of
an energy constraint at each sensor. This is formally stated as follows.
Problem 3.1.
maximize
{xi,yi}i=1,··· ,N
Dfc
subject to 1. De ≤ α
2.
(
σ2s + pi1θ
2
)
xTi xi + y
T
i yi ≤ E ,
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
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For the sake of notational simplicity, let us assume
zi =
 xi
yi
 .
Then, Equations (3.10a) and (3.10b) can be rewritten as follows.
Dfc =
θ2
2σ2s
N∑
i=1
[
zTi Aizi
zTi Bizi + c
]
(3.11a)
De =
θ2
2σ2s
N∑
i=1
[
zTi Cizi
zTi Dizi + e
]
(3.11b)
where
Ai =
 Hi1 0
0 0
 , Bi =
 Hi1 0
0
1
σ2s
Hi2
 ,
Ci =
 Gi1 0
0 0
 , Di =
 Gi1 0
0
1
σ2s
Gi2
 ,
c =
σ2fc
σ2s
and e =
σ2e
σ2s
.
Note that ignoring the constant
θ2
2σ2s
in the objective function does not affect the optimal
solution of Problem 3.1. Let
β =
2σ2s
θ2
α and E =
 (σ2s + pi1θ2) IL 0
0 IL
 .
Then, Problem 3.1 can be equivalently written as follows.
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Problem 3.2.
maximize
{z1,··· ,zN}
N∑
i=1
[
zTi Aizi
zTi Bizi + c
]
subject to 1.
N∑
i=1
[
zTi Cizi
zTi Dizi + e
]
≤ β
2. zTi Ezi ≤ E ,
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Note that Problem 3.1 is a hard, non-convex problem. In fact, the problem is non-
convex even if N = 1. Therefore, we propose two approximate solutions to Problem 3.2
via employing semidefinite relaxation and convex-concave restriction.
3.3 Approximation via Semidefinite Relaxation
Without any loss of generality, we introduce N slack variables β1, · · · , βN by assuming
zTi Cizi
zTi Dizi + e
≤ βi, ∀ i = 1, · · · , N. (3.12)
In other words, βi is an upper bound on the contribution of the ith sensor to the Eve’s KL
Divergence. Substituting Equation (3.12) in Problem 3.2, we have the following equivalent
problem statement.
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Problem 3.3.
maximize
{z1,··· ,zN},{β1,··· ,βN}
N∑
i=1
[
zTi Aizi
zTi Bizi + c
]
subject to 1.
zTi Cizi
zTi Dizi + e
≤ βi,
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N
2.
N∑
i=1
βi ≤ β,
3. zTi Ezi ≤ E ,
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Note that, if the optimal decomposition β∗ = {β∗1 , · · · , β∗N} are known beforehand,
the above problem can be decomposed into N independent problems without any loss of
optimality, as shown below in Problem 3.4, because of two reasons:
• The objective function is linearly separable.
• Constraint 2 is the only coupling condition in Problem 3.3, which is itself a linearly
separable function.
Problem 3.4. For a given βi (which is chosen such that
N∑
i=1
βi ≤ β),
maximize
zi
zTi Aizi
zTi Bizi + c
subject to 1.
zTi Cizi
zTi Dizi + e
≤ βi,
2. zTi Ezi ≤ E .
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Before we determine {β1, · · · , βN} and the corresponding approximate solution, let us
consider the problem of optimal network design in the absence of an Eve’s constraint. This
is formally stated in Problem 3.5.
Problem 3.5.
maximize
zi
zTi Aizi
zTi Bizi + c
subject to 1. zTi Ezi ≤ E .
Let D˜FCi and z˜i denote the optimal solution to Problem 3.5. Then, we have
D˜FCi = λmax
(
Ai,Bi +
cE
E
)
(3.13a)
z˜i = η
√
E
ηTEη
(3.13b)
where λmax(Λ1,Λ2) is the generalized eigenvalue2 of the two given matrices Λ1 and Λ2,
and η is the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the aforementioned eigenvalue given
in Equation (3.13a). For a detailed account on the computation of generalized eigenvalues
and eigenvectors, the reader may refer to [7, 37].
We can compute the KL Divergence D˜Ei that the Eve attains, due to the i
th sensor, as
follows.
D˜Ei =
z˜i
TCiz˜i
z˜i
TDiz˜i + e
(3.14)
Note that both D˜FCi and D˜Ei are both upper-bounds on the optimal values of DFCi and
DEi as they are the solutions of the unconstrained problem, which are found by solving
Problem 3.1.
In the remaining section, we present our proposed methodology to find an efficient
2The generalized eigenvalue ψ and eigenvector µ of the matrices Λ1 and Λ2 satisfy Λ1µ = ψΛ2µ.
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solution to Problem 3.3 by solving it in three stages. In the first stage, we find reasonable
values for βi based on the channel conditions at the FC and Eve using a greedy algorithm.
In the second stage, we provide an optimal solution to each of the following decomposed
problems using semi-definite relaxation (SDR). In the final stage, we use the above solution
to construct an efficient and a feasible solution using randomization techniques.
Stage 1: Efficient Decomposition
In this subsection, we propose a sequential methodology in order to compute the value of
{β1, · · · , βN} based on a specific ordering of the sensors. Intuitively, we expect that the
choice of this sensor-ordering is based on the combined effect of the sensing observations
and the channel models at both the FC and Eve.
Therefore, we first construct a vector k = {k1, · · · , kN} which, when sorted in a de-
creasing manner, gives the sensor-ordering in terms of their allocation quality. For the sake
of tractability, we assume that k is independent of the choice of {z1, · · · , zN}. With this as-
sumption, we deviate from the optimal solution of Problem 3.3. Note that the construction
of the sensor-ordering is key to the efficiency of our solution approach.
In this chapter, we define the ordering metric ki based on the objective function as
follows.
ki = D˜FCi . (3.15)
Our intuition behind choosing this definition for ki is that the sensors shall be ordered
in terms of their respective contribution to the overall KL Divergence at the FC. Note that,
since DFCi and DEi have a monotonic relationship, increasing ki increases the value of βi.
Therefore, we denote the sorted vector of sensor-indices, as isort = {i1, · · · , iN}, which
are ordered in a decreasing order of k. In other words, kij ≥ kij+1 for all j = 1, · · · , N−1.
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Let ij denote the jth entry in isort. Then, βij is given by
βij = min
{
∆j−1, D˜Ei
}
, (3.16)
where ∆j−1 = β −
j−1∑
k=1
βik is the residual value that needs to be allocated to the rest of
the sensors with indices beyond the (j − 1)th entry in the vector isort, with its initial value
defined as ∆0 = β.
Note that our choice of {β1, · · · , βN} satisfies Constraint 2 in Problem 3.3. Therefore,
the proposed solution always lies within the feasible region of Problem 3.3.
Stage 2: Semidefinite Programming
In this subsection, we present a SDR-based methodology to approximately solve Problem
3.4. Note that since Problem 3.4 is completely defined locally at the ith sensor, we remove
the index i for notational convenience. In the case of βi, we replace the notation with δ in
order to avoid any confusion. Therefore, we restate Problem 3.4 by removing the index i,
as follows.
Problem 3.6.
maximize
z
zTAz
zTBz + c
subject to 1.
zTCz
zTDz + e
≤ δ,
2. zTEz ≤ E .
(3.17)
Without any loss of generality, let
1
zTBz + c
= u2. (3.18)
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where u is a non-negative slack variable. Replacing the variable z with a new variable
t = uz, Problem 3.6 can be equivalently expressed as follows.
Problem 3.7.
maximize
t,u
tTAt
subject to 1. tT (C− δD) t ≤ eδu2,
2. tTEt ≤ E u2
3. tTBt + c · u2 = 1
Note that, since the matrix A is positive semidefinite, the objective function is convex.
Therefore, Constraint 3 can be relaxed into an inequality tTBt + c · u2 ≤ 1 without any
loss of generality, since Problem 3.7 is a convex-maximization problem. Furthermore,
If (t∗, u∗) is the optimal solution to Problem 3.7, then the optimal solution is given by
z∗ = t∗/u∗.
To simplify further, we define the combined optimization variable v =
 t
u
 in order
to have the following problem.
Problem 3.8.
maximize
v
vTM0v
subject to 1. vTM1v ≤ 0,
2. vTM2v ≤ 0
3. vTM3v ≤ 1
74
where
M0 =
 A 0
0T 0
, M1 =
 C− δD 0
0T −eδ
,
M2 =
 E 0
0T −E
 and M3 =
 B 0
0T c
.
Let V = vvT . Note that V is rank-1 and positive semidefinite. Therefore, Problem 3.8
can be equivalently written in a matrix-form as follows.
Problem 3.9.
maximize
V
Tr (VM0)
subject to 1. Tr (VM1) ≤ 0,
2. Tr (VM2) ≤ 0
3. Tr (VM3) ≤ 1
4. V  0,
5. rank(V ) = 1.
Note that, in Problem 3.9, if Constraint 5 does not exist, we have a standard SDP
which can be solved exactly in polynomial time [10]. Therefore, we relax the problem by
removing the rank-constraint as follows.
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Problem 3.10.
maximize
V
Tr (VM0)
subject to 1. Tr (VM1) ≤ 0,
2. Tr (VM2) ≤ 0
3. Tr (VM3) ≤ 1
4. V  0.
Note that Problem 3.10 is a standard SDP and can be solved exactly in polynomial time
using standard algorithms such as the interior-point algorithm [10]. This solution acts as an
upper bound to the solution of Problem 3.9 since the search space gets expanded with the
removal of Constraint 5. Furthermore, in our simulation experiments, we have observed
that Problem 3.10 does not yield a rank-1 solution. Therefore, we investigate Problem 3.8
using approximations based on randomization.
Stage 3: Randomization
Let  ∼ N (0,V ) denote a random vector of size (2L + 1). In other words, since V =
E(T ), Problem 3.9 can be interpreted [34] as follows.
Problem 3.11.
maximize
V
Tr
[
E(T )M0
]
subject to 1. Tr
[
E(T )M1
] ≤ 0,
2. Tr
[
E(T )M2
] ≤ 0
3. Tr
[
E(T )M3
] ≤ 1.
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Figure 3.2: Improvement in KL Divergence with increasing number of samples M in the
randomization procedure
This interpretation motivates us to construct v∗ in the following manner.
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Figure 3.3: KL Divergences at both FC and Eve for increasing number of random samples M , when L = 1, 3, 5, N = 10 and α = 5.
78
Let 1, · · · , M , be M vectors that are sampled from the distributionN (0,V ∗), where
V ∗ is the solution to Problem 3.10. Note that each of these vectors 1, · · · , M are potential
candidates to approximate the solution of Problem 3.8. Therefore, we pick the best solution
from the M available vectors as follows.
For m = 1, · · · ,M,
Sample m fromN (0,V ∗).
Evaluate f(m) = TmM0m
Find m∗ = arg max
m=1,··· ,M
f(m).
(3.19)
Therefore, we propose v∗ = m∗ as the solution to Problem 3.8. From v∗, we evaluate
the approximate solution z∗ to Problem 3.6, as follows:
z∗ =
 x∗
y∗
 = (µT2 v)−1 (µT1 v) (3.20)
where
µ1 =

1
...
1
0

and µ2 =

0
...
0
1

.
3.4 Simulation Results
Consider an example network withN = 10 sensors, each equipped withL = 5 transmitting
antennas, a total energy budget E = 2 and σ2s = 1. We assume that the PoI is characterized
by θ = 1, with prior probabilities pi0 = 1− pi1 = 0.8. Furthermore, we assume that each of
the channel gains at both the FC and Eve are realizations of a standard Rayleigh distribu-
tion. In our simulations, we take 100 different realizations of this Rayleigh distribution in
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order to evaluate the average performance of our system in all our simulation results.
Before we investigate the performance of our network design, we first focus our at-
tention on the randomization procedure used in Stage 2 of our proposed algorithm. It is
well known that the randomization procedure approaches the optimal value with increasing
number of random samples, when there is only one non-convex constraint in the problem
statement [34]. But, since M1 and M2 are not positive semidefinite, there is no guarantee
for the convergence of the approximated solution to the optimal one. Therefore, we first
demonstrate the performance of the randomization procedure proposed to solve Problem
3.6 (single sensor case) for this example scenario when the tolerable Eve’s constraint is
given by δ = 0.5. We plot the KL Divergence at the FC due to a single sensor in Fig-
ure 3.2 and show that the system performance in terms of KL Divergence at FC by our
proposed approach improves with increasing number of random samples collected in the
randomization procedure presented in Stage 2 of our design-algorithm. Note that the solid-
line in Figure 3.2 corresponds to the average KL Divergence that the FC attains, while the
dotted-line corresponds to the average maximum KL Divergence attained at the FC in the
absence of the secrecy constraint, as given by Equation (3.13a). Since the performance of
the dotted-line is the optimal KL Divergence attained at the FC in the absence of a secrecy
constraint on Eve, it acts like an upper bound to the optimal solution to Problem 3.6. Note
that the randomization approach works well in our problem since the approximate solution
to n = 1 case converges to a value that is very close to the optimal solution.
Given that the randomization algorithm works well in the context of our problem frame-
work, we next illustrate the performance of our proposed design algorithm in two different
simulation results. In the first experiment, we plot DFC and DE for varying number of
random samples in the randomization procedure in Figure 3.3. As per our intuition, we
observe that the KL Divergences at both the FC and Eve increases with increasing number
of random samples. More specifically, in Figure 3.3a, we consider the scenario where the
FC has better channels than Eve (i.e. when σ2fc ≤ σ2e ). Here, we observe that the difference
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Figure 3.4: KL Divergences at both FC and Eve for increasing number of sensor antennas
L, when σ2e = 0.5, N = 10 and α = 5.
between the KL Divergences at the FC and Eve increases with increasing number of sensor
antennas. On the other hand, in Figure 3.3b, we consider the opposite scenario where the
Eve has better channels than the FC (i.e. when σ2fc ≤ σ2e ). In this scenario, we observe a
tremendous improvement in the performance of the FC as the number of sensor antennas
increases.
In the second scenario, in Figure 3.4, we plot the relationship between DFC and DE
with respect to the number of sensor antennas L for different channel scenarios at the FC
respectively. Here, we clearly observe that, while DFC increases with increasing number
of antennas, DE decreases at a relatively slow rate. Furthermore, the intersection points
between theDFC andDE curves corresponding to a given value of σ2fc give us the minimum
number of sensor antennas needed to ensure a greater KL Divergence at the FC than that
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of Eve.
3.5 Summary
In summary, we have proposed a transmit-diversity framework for detection networks
where the KL Divergence at the FC is maximized in the presence of a total energy bud-
get at each sensor and a constraint on the Eve’s KL Divergence. In this transmit-diversity
framework, the sensors are allowed to construct a transmission signal by distributing the
total energy between their observations and the artificial noise across multiple transmitting
antennas. In this chapter, we have proposed a two-stage approximate algorithm to find
efficient signaling at the sensors based on a greedy decomposition and random-sampling
procedures. We have presented numerical results to illustrate the performance of the pro-
posed design.
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CHAPTER 4
BYZANTINE ATTACKS IN INFERENCE
NETWORKS WITH M-ARY QUANTIZED
DATA
Statistical inferences are reliable only when the data-collection process is reliable. If the
sensing agents participating in the data-collection process are compromised, the inference
performance can be deteriorated significantly. Therefore, in this chapter, we investigate
the fundamental performance-limits of inference networks in the presence of Byzantine
attacks, in addition to proposing an anomaly-detection scheme to detect the compromised
agents in the network. We focus our attention on two inference problems, namely detection
and estimation, when the sensors quantize their data to a more general M -ary symbols,
with M = 2 (binary quantization) and M → ∞ (centralized inference networks) being
special cases.
The main contributions of the chapter are three-fold. First, in Section 4.2, we define
a Byzantine attack model for a sensor network with individual sensors quantizing their
observations into one of the M-ary symbols, when the attacker does not have complete
knowledge about the true state of the POI and thresholds employed by the sensors. We
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model the attack strategy as a flipping probability matrix, where (i, j)th entry represents
the probability with which the ith symbol is flipped into the jth symbol. Second, we show
that quantization into M-ary symbols at the sensors, as opposed to binary quantization, im-
proves both inference as well as security performance simultaneously. As a function of the
number of Byzantine nodes in the network, we derive the optimal flipping matrix for both
ideal and non-ideal (discrete memoryless) channels in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
In Section 4.5, we investigate the optimal Byzantine attack in the context of distributed
detection and estimation when the attacker is resource-constrained to compromise enough
number of nodes in the network to blind the FC (to be defined in Section 4.2). Finally, in
Section 4.6, we extend the mitigation scheme presented by Rawat et al. in [52] to the more
general case where sensors generate M-ary symbols. We present numerical/simulation re-
sults to illustrate the performance of the proposed network-design.
4.1 Literature Survey
In the context of distributed inference networks, the sensing agents compress their obser-
vations by mapping them to one of the symbols in an alphabet set of size M , prior to
transmission to the FC. In the context of sensing agents with binary quantization (M = 2)
capabilities, a lot of work is done in the past to address Byzantine attacks in the context of
distributed inference networks (see a recent survey [68] by Vempaty et al.).
Byzantine attacks (proposed by Lamport et al. in [27]) in general, are arbitrary and
may refer to many types of malicious behavior. In this chapter, we focus only on the data-
falsification aspect of the Byzantine attack wherein one or more compromised nodes of the
network send false information to the FC in order to deteriorate the inference performance
of the network. A well known example of this attack is the man-in-the-middle attack [44]
where, on one hand, the attacker collects data from the sensors whose authentication pro-
cess is compromised by the attacker emulating as the FC, while, on the other hand, the
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attacker sends false information to the FC using the compromised sensors’ identity. In
summary, if the ith sensor’s authentication is compromised, the attacker remains invisible
to the network, accepts the true decision ui from the ith sensor and sends vi to the FC in
order to deteriorate the inference performance.
Marano et al., in [35], analyzed the Byzantine attack on a network of sensors carry-
ing out the task of distributed detection, where the attacker is assumed to have complete
knowledge about the hypotheses. This represents the extreme case of Byzantine nodes hav-
ing an extra power of knowing the true hypothesis. In their model, they assumed that the
sensors quantized their respective observations into M-ary symbols, which are later fused
at the FC. The Byzantine nodes pick symbols using an optimal probability distribution that
are conditioned on the true hypotheses, and transmit them to the FC in order to maximally
degrade the detection performance. Rawat et al., in [52], also considered the problem of
distributed detection in the presence of Byzantine attacks with binary quantizers at the sen-
sors in their analysis. Unlike the authors in [35], Rawat et al. did not assume complete
knowledge of the true hypotheses at the Byzantine attacker. Instead, they assumed that the
Byzantine nodes derive the knowledge about the true hypotheses from their own sensing
observations. In other words, a Byzantine node potentially flips the local decision made
at the node. It does not modify the thresholds at the sensor quantizers. Rawat et al. also
analyzed the performance of the network in the presence of independent and collaborative
Byzantine attacks and modeled the problem as a zero-sum game between the sensor net-
work and the Byzantine attacker. In addition to the analysis of distributed detection in the
presence of Byzantine attacks, a reputation-based scheme was proposed by Rawat et al.
in [52] for identifying the Byzantine nodes by accumulating the deviations between each
sensor’s decision and the FC’s decision over a time window of duration T . If the accumu-
lated number of deviations is greater than a prescribed threshold for a given node, then the
FC tags it as a Byzantine node. In order to mitigate the attack, the FC removes nodes which
are tagged Byzantine node from the fusion rule. Another mitigation scheme was proposed
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by Vempaty et al. [66], where each sensor’s behavior is learnt over time and compared to
the known behavior of the honest nodes. Any node with significant deviation in the learnt
behavior from the expected honest behavior is labeled a Byzantine node. Having learnt
their parameters, the authors also proposed the use of this information to adapt their fusion
rule so as to maximize the performance of the FC. In contrast to the parallel topology in
sensor networks, Kailkhura et al. in [21] investigated the problem of Byzantine attacks on
distributed detection in a hierarchical sensor network. They presented the optimal Byzan-
tine strategy when the sensors communicate their decisions to the FC in multiple hops of a
balanced tree. They assumed that the cost of compromising sensors at different levels of the
tree varies, and found the optimal Byzantine strategy that minimizes the cost of attacking a
given hierarchical network.
Soltanmohammadi et al. in [57] investigated the problem of distributed detection in the
presence of different types of Byzantine nodes. Each Byzantine node type corresponds to a
different operating point, and, therefore, the authors considered the problem of identifying
different Byzantine nodes, along with their operating points. The problem of maximum-
likelihood (ML) estimation of the operating points was formulated and solved using the
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. Once the Byzantine node operating points are
estimated, this information was utilized at the FC to mitigate the malicious activity in the
network, and also to improve global detection performance.
Distributed target localization in the presence of Byzantine attacks was addressed by
Vempaty et al. in [67], where the sensors quantize their observations into binary decisions,
which are transmitted to the FC. Similar to Rawat et al.’s approach in [52], the authors
in [67] investigated the problem of distributed target localization from both the network’s
and Byzantine attacker’s perspectives, first by identifying the optimal Byzantine attack and
second, mitigating the impact of the attack with the use of non-identical quantizers at the
sensors.
In this chapter, we extend the framework of Byzantine attacks when Byzantine nodes
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do not have complete knowledge about the true state of the phenomenon-of-interest (POI),
and when the sensors generate M-ary symbols instead of binary symbols. We also assume
that the Byzantine attacker is ignorant about the quantization thresholds used at the sen-
sors to generate the M-ary symbols.1 Under these assumptions, we address two inference
problems: binary hypotheses-testing and parameter estimation.
4.2 System Model
Consider an inference (sensor) network with N sensors, where α fraction of the nodes in
the network are assumed to be compromised (Refer to Figure 4.1a). These compromised
sensors transmit false data to the fusion center (FC) in order to deteriorate the inference
performance of the network. We assume that the network is designed to infer about a
particular phenomenon, regarding which sensors acquire conditionally-independent obser-
vations. We denote the observation of the ith sensor as ri. This observation ri is mapped
to one of the M symbols, ui ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. In a compromised inference network, since
the Byzantine sensors do not transmit their true quantized data, we denote the transmitted
symbol as vi at the ith sensor. If the node i is honest, then vi = ui. Otherwise, we assume
that the Byzantine sensor modifies ui = l to vi = m with a probability plm, as shown in
Figure 4.1b. For the sake of compactness, we denote the transition probabilities depicted
in the graph in Figure 4.1b using a row-stochastic matrix P, as follows:
P =

p11 p12 . . . p1M
p21 p22 . . . p2M
...
... . . .
...
pM1 pM2 . . . pMM

. (4.1)
1The well-known attacker-in-the-middle is one such example.
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Figure 4.1: Distributed Inference Network in the Presence of Byzantine Attacks
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Since the attacker has no knowledge of quantization thresholds employed at each sen-
sor, we assume that P is independent of the sensor observations. The messages v =
{v1, v2, · · · , vN} are transmitted to the fusion center (FC) where a global inference is made
about the phenomenon of interest based on v.
In order to consider the general inference problem, we assume that θ ∈ Θ is the pa-
rameter that denotes the phenomenon of interest in the received signal ri at the ith sensor.
If we are considering a detection/classification problem, θ is discrete (finite or countably
infinite). In the case of parameter estimation, Θ is a continuous set. Without any loss of
generality, we assume Θ = {0, 1, · · · , K − 1} if the problem of interest is classification.
Hence, detection is a special case of classification with K = 2. In the case of estimation,
we assume that Θ = R.
Based on this system model, we investigate the optimal Byzantine attack under different
scenarios in the remaining chapter. Furthermore, we also propose a mitigation scheme
where the FC computes a reputation index for each sensing agent to identify and remove
the compromised nodes from the fusion rule.
4.3 Optimal Byzantine Attacks: Noiseless Channels
Given the conditional distribution of ri, p(ri|θ), and the sensor quantization thresholds, λj
for 0 ≤ j ≤M , the conditional distribution of ui can be found as
P (ui = m|θ) =
∫ λm
λm−1
p(ri|θ)dri (4.2)
for all m = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
If the true quantized symbol at the ith node is ui = m, a compromised node will
modify it into vi = l as depicted in Figure 4.1b, and transmit it to the FC. Since the FC is
not aware of the type of the node (honest or Byzantine), it is natural to assume that node i
is compromised with probability α, where α is the fraction of nodes in the network that are
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compromised. Therefore, we find the conditional distribution of vi at the FC as follows.
P (vi = m|θ) = αP (vi = m|i = Byzantine, θ) + (1− α)P (vi = m|i = Honest, θ)
= α
M∑
l=1
P (ui = l|θ) · P (vi = m|ui = l, θ) + (1− α)P (ui = m|θ)
= α
M∑
l=1
plmP (ui = l|θ) + (1− α)P (ui = m|θ)
= α
∑
l 6=m
plmP (ui = l|θ) + [(1− α) + αpmm]P (ui = m|θ)
= [(1− α) + αpmm] +
∑
l 6=m
{αplm − [(1− α) + αpmm]}P (ui = l|θ).
(4.3)
The goal of a Byzantine attack is to blind the FC with the least amount of effort (minimum
α). To totally blind the FC is equivalent to making P (vi = m|θ) = 1/M for all 0 ≤
m ≤ M − 1. In Equation (4.3), the RHS consists of two terms. The first one is based on
prior knowledge and the second term conveys information based on the observations. In
order to blind the FC, the attacker should make the second term equal to zero. Since the
attacker does not have any knowledge regarding P (ui = l|θ), it can make the second term
of Equation (4.3) equal to zero by setting
αplm = (1− α) + αpmm, ∀ l 6= m. (4.4)
Then the conditional probability P (vi = m|θ) = (1−α) +αpmm becomes independent of
the observations ri (or its quantized version ui), resulting in equiprobable symbols at the
FC. In other words, the received vector v = {v1, v2, · · · , vN} does not carry any informa-
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tion about θ and, therefore, results in the most degraded performance at the FC. So, the FC
now has to solely depend on its prior information about θ in making an inference.
Having identified the condition in Equation (4.4) under which the Byzantine attack
makes the greatest impact on the performance of the network, we identify the strategy that
the attacker should employ in order to achieve this condition as follows. Since we need
P (vi = m|θ) = (1− α) + αpmm = 1/M,
α = M−1
(1−pmm)M . To minimize α, one needs to make pmm = 0. In this chapter, we denote the
α corresponding to this optimal strategy that minimizes the Byzantine attacker’s resources
required to blind the FC as αblind. Hence,
αblind =
M − 1
M
.
Rearranging Equation (4.4), we have
1
α
= 1 + (plm − pmm) = 1 + plm ∀ l 6= m. (4.5)
By setting α to αblind, we have plm = 1/(M−1), ∀ l 6= m. That is, the transition probability
P is a highly-symmetric matrix. We summarize the result as a theorem as follows.
Theorem 4.1. If the Byzantine attacker has no knowledge of the quantization thresholds
employed at each sensor, then the optimal Byzantine attack is given as
plm =

1
M − 1 ; if l 6= m
0 ; otherwise
αblind =
M − 1
M
.
(4.6)
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Figure 4.2: Improvement in αblind with increasing number of quantization levels
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Quantization bits Quantization levels Blinding fraction
(log2M) (M) (αblind)
1 21 = 2 0.5
2 22 = 4 0.75
3 23 = 8 0.875
4 24 = 16 0.9375
5 25 = 32 0.9688
6 26 = 64 0.9844
7 27 = 128 0.9922
8 28 = 256 0.9961
Table 4.1: Improvement in αblind with increasing number of quantization levels M , and
quantization bits, log2M
We term Equation (4.6) as the optimal Byzantine attack, since the FC does not get
any information from the data v it receives from the sensors to perform an inference task.
Therefore, the FC has to rely on prior information about the parameter θ, if available.
In Figure 4.2, we show how αblind scales with increasing quantization alphabet size, M .
Since the quantized symbols are encoded into bits, we also show an exponential increase
in αblind as the number of bits needed to encode the M symbols, i.e., log2M , increases.
This is also shown in Table 4.1. Note that, if the sensors use one additional quantization-
bit (2-bit quantization) in their quantization scheme instead of 1-bit quantization (binary
quantization), then the αblind increases from 0.5 to 0.75. This trend is observed with in-
creasing number of quantization bits, and when the sensors employ an 8-bit quantizer, then
93
the attacker needs to compromise at least 99.6% of the sensors in the network to blind the
FC. Obviously, the improvement in security performance is not free as the sensors incur a
communication cost in terms of energy and bandwidth as the number of quantization bits
increases. Therefore, in a practical world, the network designer faces a trade-off between
the communication cost and the security guarantees.
Also, note that, when M = 2 (1-bit quantization), our results coincide with those of
Rawat et al. in [52], where the focus was on the problem of binary hypotheses testing in
a distributed sensor network. On the other hand, our results are more general as they ad-
dress any inference problem - detection, estimation or classification in a distributed sensor
network. Another extreme case to note is when M → ∞, in which case, αblind → 1. This
means that the Byzantine attacker cannot blind the FC unless all the sensors are compro-
mised.
4.4 Optimal Byzantine Attacks: Discrete Memoryless
Channels
Given that the messages v = {v1, v2, · · · , vN} are transmitted to the fusion center (FC),
we assume a discrete noise channel Q = [qmn] between the sensors and the FC, where qmn
is the probability with which vi = m is transformed to symbol zi = n at the ith sensor.
Based on the received z at the FC, a global inference is made about the phenomenon of
interest. In this section, we assume that the row-stochastic channel matrix Q is invertible
for the sake of tractability.
Given the transition probability matrix Q for the channel between the sensors and the
FC, we assume that the FC receives zi = n when the the ith sensor transmits vi = m, with
a probability qmn. The conditional distribution of zi = n under a given phenomenon θ, is
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given as
P (zi = n|θ) =
M∑
m=1
qmnP (vi = m|θ). (4.7)
Note that if Q is a doubly stochastic matrix, since
M∑
m=1
qmn = 1, it is sufficient for the
Byzantine attacker to ensure P (vi = m|θ) = 1M . Thus, by Theorem 4.1, we have the
following theorem when Q is a doubly stochastic matrix.
Theorem 4.2. If the channel matrix Q is doubly-stochastic, and if the Byzantine attacker
has no knowledge about the sensors’ quantization thresholds, then the optimal Byzantine
attack is given as
plm =

1
M − 1 ; if l 6= m
0 ; otherwise
αblind =
M − 1
M
.
(4.8)
Therefore, we focus our attention to any general row-stochastic channel matrix Q,
where
M∑
m=1
qmn need not necessarily sum to unity for all n = 1, · · · ,M . In other words, the
Byzantine attacker has to find an alternative strategy to blind the FC, where P (zi = n|θ) =
1
M
. Substituting Equation (4.3) in Equation (4.7) and rearranging the terms, we have
P (zi = n|θ) =
M∑
m=1
qmnP (vi = m|θ)
=
M∑
m=1
qmn[(1− α) + αpmm]
+
M∑
m=1
qmn
{∑
l 6=m
{αplm − [(1− α) + αpmm]}P (ui = l|θ)
}
=
M∑
m=1
qmn[(1− α) + αpmm]
+
M∑
l=1
[∑
m 6=l
qmn{αplm − [(1− α) + αpmm]}
]
P (ui = l|θ).
(4.9)
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The goal of a Byzantine attack is to blind the FC with the least amount of effort (min-
imum α). To totally blind the FC is equivalent to making P (zi = n|θ) = 1/M for all
0 ≤ n ≤ M − 1. In Equation (4.9), the RHS consists of two terms. The first one is based
on prior knowledge and the second term conveys information based on the observations.
In order to blind the FC, the attacker should make the second term equal to zero. Since the
attacker does not have any knowledge regarding P (ui = l|θ), it can make the second term
of Equation (4.9) equal to zero by setting
∑
m 6=l
qmn{αplm − [(1− α) + αpmm]} = 0 for all 1 ≤ n, l ≤M. (4.10)
Then the conditional probability P (zi = n|θ) =
M∑
m=1
qmn[(1 − α) + αpmm] becomes in-
dependent of the observations ri (or its quantized version ui), resulting in equiprobable
symbols at the FC. In other words, the received vector z = {z1, z2, · · · , zN} does not carry
any information about u = {u1, u2, · · · , uN}, thus making FC solely dependent on its prior
information about θ in making an inference.
In order to identify the strategy that the attacker should employ to achieve the condition
in Equation (4.10), for all n = 1, · · · ,M , we need
P (zi = n|θ) = 1
M
,
or,
M∑
m=1
qmn {(1− α) + αpmm} = 1
M
.
(4.11)
In matrix form, we can rewrite Equation (4.11) as
(1− α)1TQ + αpTQ = 1
M
1T ,
where 1 is an all-one column-vector and p = [p11, · · · , pMM ]T is the column-vector of all
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diagonal elements of P. In other words,
α(1− p) = 1− 1
M
(
QT
)−1
1 (4.12)
Note that every element in the LHS of Equation (4.12) always lies between 0 and 1.
Therefore, the existence of the Byzantine’s optimal strategy relies on the following condi-
tion. In other words,
0 ≤ (QT )−1 1 ≤ M 1. (4.13)
If (4.13) does not hold, there does not exist an optimal strategy. Given that the condition in
Equation (4.13) holds, the minimum α can be found as follows.
αblind = min
{
1− 1
M
(
QT
)−1
1
}
= 1− 1
M
max
{(
QT
)−1
1
}
.
(4.14)
Therefore, p can be calculated as
p = 1− 1
αblind
(
1− 1
M
(
QT
)−1
1
)
=
1
αblindM
(
QT
)−1
1− 1− αblind
αblind
1.
(4.15)
Next, in order to find the rest of the P matrix, let us consider Equation (4.10). Adding
qln {αpll − [1− α + αpll]} on both sides to Equation (4.10), for all 1 ≤ n, l ≤M , we have
M∑
m=1
qmn{αplm − [(1− α) + αpmm]} = −qln(1− α)
or, α
M∑
m=1
qmnplm =
1
M
− qln(1− α).
(4.16)
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In matrix form, we have
αPQ =
1
M
1− (1− α)Q, (4.17)
where 1 is an all-one matrix. Equivalently, we have
P =
1
αM
1Q−1 − 1− α
α
I, (4.18)
where I is the identity matrix. Note that the vector p (comprising the diagonal elements of
P) obtained from Equation (4.18) is verified to be same as that from Equation (4.15).
In summary, we have the following theorem that provides the optimal Byzantine strat-
egy in the presence of noisy FC channels:
Theorem 4.3. Let the Byzantine attacker have no knowledge about the sensors’ quan-
tization thresholds, and, the FC’s channel matrix be Q. If Q is non-singular, and, if
0 ≤ (QT )−1 1 ≤ M1, then the optimal Byzantine attack is given as
αblind = 1− 1
M
max
{(
QT
)−1
1
}
P =
1
αblindM
1Q−1 − 1− αblind
αblind
I.
(4.19)
Note that, if the channel matrix Q is doubly-stochastic, we have Q1 = 1 and QT1 = 1.
Substituting these conditions in Equation (4.19), Theorem 4.3 reduces to Theorem 4.2.
Having identified the optimal Byzantine attack, one can observe that the attacker needs
to compromise a huge number of sensors (αblind = 1 − 1
M
max
{(
QT
)−1
1
}
) in the net-
work to blind the FC. Therefore, it is obvious that, in the case of a resource-constrained
attacker, the attacker compromises a fixed fraction of nodes α ≤ αblind in such a way that
the performance degradation at the FC is maximized. In our future work, we will inves-
tigate the problem of finding the optimal strategy in the context of resource-constrained
Byzantine attacks in the presence of noisy FC channels.
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4.5 Optimal Byzantine Attacks: Constrained Resources
4.5.1 Distributed Detection
In this section, we consider a resource-constrained Byzantine attack on binary hypotheses
testing in a distributed sensor network where the phenomenon of interest is denoted as θ
and is modeled as follows:
θ =

0; if H0
1; if H1
. (4.20)
In order to characterize the performance of the FC, we consider Kullback-Leibler Di-
vergence (KLD) as the performance metric. Note that KLD can be interpreted as the error
exponent in the Neyman-Pearson detection framework [13], which means that the proba-
bility of missed detection goes to zero exponentially with the number of sensors at a rate
equal to KLD computed at the FC. We denote KLD at the FC by DFC and define it as
follows:
DFC = EH0
[
log
(
P (v|H0)
P (v|H1)
)]
=
∑
m∈{1,··· ,M}N
P (v = m|H0) · log
(
P (v = m|H0)
P (v = m|H1)
) (4.21)
Since we have assumed that the sensor observations are conditionally independent,2 KLD
can be expressed as
DFC = NDFC , (4.22)
where
DFC =
M∑
m=1
P (v = m|H0) · log
(
P (v = m|H0)
P (v = m|H1)
)
.
Note that the optimal Byzantine attack, as given in Equation (4.6), results in equiprobable
2For notational convenience, sensor index i is ignored in the rest of the section.
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symbols at the FC irrespective of the hypotheses. Therefore, DFC = 0 under optimal
Byzantine attack, resulting in the blinding of the FC.
On the other hand, if the attacker does not have enough resources to compromise αblind
fraction of sensors in the network (i.e. α < αblind), an optimal strategy for the Byzantine
node is to use an appropriate P matrix that deteriorates the performance of the sensor
network to the maximal extent. In this section, we restrict our search to finding the optimal
P within a space of highly symmetric row-stochastic matrices, as given in Equation (4.23).
pjk =

p if j 6= k
1− (M − 1)p otherwise.
(4.23)
Thus, we formulate the problem as follows.
Problem 4.1. Given the value of α < αblind, find the optimal P within a space of highly
symmetric row-stochastic matrices, as given in Equation (4.23), such that
minimize
p
DFC
subject to 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
M − 1
Theorem 4.4 presents the optimal flipping probability that provides the solution to Prob-
lem 4.1. Note that this result is independent of the design of the sensor network and, there-
fore, can be employed when the Byzantine has no knowledge about the network.
Theorem 4.4. Given a fixed α <
M − 1
M
, the probability p that optimizes P within a space
of highly symmetric row-stochastic matrices, as given in Equation (4.23), such that DFC is
minimized, is given by
p∗ =
1
M − 1 . (4.24)
Proof. For the sake of notational simplicity, let us denote xm = P (u = m|H0) and ym =
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P (u = m|H1). Similarly, x˜m = P (v = m|H0) and y˜m = P (v = m|H1).
Rewriting Equation (4.3) in our new notation, we have
x˜m = α
∑
l 6=m
pxl + (1− α(M − 1)p)xm = αp+ (1−Mαp)xm (4.25)
and
y˜m = α
∑
l 6=m
pyl + (1− α(M − 1)p)ym = αp+ (1−Mαp)ym. (4.26)
Therefore, the KLD at the FC can be rewritten as
DFC =
M∑
m=1
x˜m log
(
x˜m
y˜m
)
. (4.27)
On partially differentiating DFC with respect to p, we have
∂DFC
∂p
=
∂
∂p
M∑
m=1
x˜m log
(
x˜m
y˜m
)
= α
M∑
m=1
[
(1−Mxm)
(
1 + log
x˜m
y˜m
)
− (1−Mym) x˜m
y˜m
]
= α
M∑
m=1
(1−Mxm) + α
M∑
m=1
(1−Mxm) log x˜m
y˜m
− α
M∑
m=1
(1−Mym) x˜m
y˜m
.
(4.28)
Consider the first term in the RHS of Equation (4.28). Note that, since x = {x1, · · · , xM}
is a probability mass function, we have
M∑
m=1
(1−Mxm) = M −M
M∑
m=1
xm = M −M = 0.
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Therefore, Equation (4.28) reduces to
∂DFC
∂p
= α
M∑
m=1
(1−Mxm) log x˜m
y˜m
− α
M∑
m=1
(1−Mym) x˜m
y˜m
. (4.29)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (4.29), we have
∂DFC
∂p
= α
M∑
m=1
[
log
x˜m
y˜m
− x˜m
y˜m
]
− αM
M∑
m=1
xm log
x˜m
y˜m
+ αM
M∑
m=1
ym
x˜m
y˜m
. (4.30)
Let us denote the first term as T1. In other words,
T1 = α
M∑
m=1
[
log
x˜m
y˜m
− x˜m
y˜m
]
.
Let us now focus our attention on the other terms in the RHS of Equation (4.30). Sub-
stituting Equations (4.25) and (4.26) in the second and third terms of the RHS of Equation
(4.30), we have
∂DFC
∂p
= T1 − Mα
1−Mαp
M∑
m=1
(x˜m − αp) log x˜m
y˜m
+
Mα
1−Mαp
M∑
m=1
(y˜m − αp) x˜m
y˜m
= T1 − Mα
1−MαpD(x˜||y˜) +
Mα
1−Mαp
{
M∑
m=1
αp log
x˜m
y˜m
−
M∑
m=1
αp
x˜m
y˜m
+
M∑
m=1
x˜m
}
,
(4.31)
whereD(x˜||y˜) is the KLD between x˜ and y˜ and is, therefore, non-negative. Also, note that
in Equation (4.31), since x˜ = {x˜1, · · · , x˜M} is a probability mass function,
M∑
m=1
xˆm = 1.
Therefore, Equation (4.31) reduces to
∂DFC
∂p
= T1 − Mα
1−MαpD(x˜||y˜) +
Mα
1−Mαp +
Mα2p
1−Mαp
M∑
m=1
[
log
x˜m
y˜m
− x˜m
y˜m
]
.
(4.32)
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Note that the last term in the RHS of Equation (4.32),
Mα2p
1−Mαp
M∑
m=1
[
log
x˜m
y˜m
− x˜m
y˜m
]
=
Mαp
1−MαpT1.
In other words,
∂DFC
∂p
=
(
1 +
Mαp
1−Mαp
)
T1 − Mα
1−MαpD(x˜||y˜) +
Mα
1−Mαp
=
1
1−MαpT1 −
Mα
1−MαpD(x˜||y˜) +
Mα
1−Mαp.
(4.33)
Rearranging the terms in Equation (4.33) and expanding T1, we have
∂DFC
∂p
= − Mα
1−MαpD(x˜||y˜) +
Mα
1−Mαp +
α
1−Mαp
M∑
m=1
[
log
x˜m
y˜m
− x˜m
y˜m
]
= − Mα
1−MαpD(x˜||y˜) +
α
1−Mαp
M∑
m=1
[
log
x˜m
y˜m
−
(
x˜m
y˜m
− 1
)]
.
(4.34)
Since log x ≤ x − 1 for all x, we find that the second term in the RHS of Equation
(4.29) is negative. Therefore, we have
∂DFC
∂p
≤ 0. (4.35)
Since DFC is a non-increasing function of p, the optimal p, p∗, takes the maximum value
1/(M − 1).
Note that this solution is of particular interest to the Byzantine attacker since the solu-
tion does not require any knowledge about the sensor network design. Also, the attacker’s
strategy is very simple to implement.
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Numerical Results
For illustration purposes, let us consider the following example, where the inference net-
work is deployed to aid the opportunistic spectrum access for a cognitive radio network
(CRN). In other words, the CRs are sensing a licensed spectrum band to find the vacant
band for the operation of the CRN.
Let the observation model at the ith sensor be defined as follows.
ri = s(θ) + ni, (4.36)
where θ ∈ {0, 1}, s(θ) = µ · (−1)1+θ is a BPSK-modulated symbol transmitted by the
licensed (or the primary) user transmitter, and the noise ni is the AWGN at the ith sensor
with probability distributionN (0, σ2).
Therefore, the conditional distribution of ri underH0 andH1 can be given asN (−µ, σ2)
and N (µ, σ2) respectively. The range of ri spans the entire real line (R). However, we
assume that the quantizer restricts the support by limiting the range of output values to a
smaller range, say [−A,A]. This parameter A is called the overloading parameter [51] be-
cause the choice ofA dictates the amount of overloading distortion caused by the quantizer.
Within this restricted range of observations, we assume a uniform quantizer with a step size
(called the granularity parameter) given by ∆ = 2
M−2 , which dictates the granularity dis-
tortion of the quantizer. In other words, the observation ri is quantized using the following
quantizer:
ui =

0; if −∞ < ri ≤ λ1
1; if λ1 < ri ≤ λ2
...
M − 1; if λM−1 < ri ≤ ∞
, (4.37)
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where
λi = A ·
[
2(i− 1)
M − 2 − 1
]
.
Note that, λ1 = −A and λM−1 = A represent the restricted range of the quantizer, as
discussed earlier. The ith sensor transmits a symbol vi to the FC, where vi = ui if it is
honest. In the case of the ith sensor being a Byzantine node, the decision ui is modified
into vi using the flipping probability matrix P as given in Equation (4.6).
Although the performance of a given sensor network is quantified by the probability
of error at the FC, we use a surrogate metric, as described earlier, called the KLD at the
FC (Refer to Equation (4.21)) for the sake of tractability. In an asymptotic sense, Stein’s
Lemma [13] states that the KLD is the rate at which the probability of missed detection
converges to zero under a constrained probability of false alarm. Therefore, in our numer-
ical results, we present how KLD at the FC varies with the fraction of Byzantine nodes α,
in the network.
For the above sensor network, we assume that µ = 1, σ2 = 1 and A = 2. In Figure 4.3,
we plot the contribution of each sensor in terms of KLD at the FC as a function of α, for 1-
bit, 2-bit, 3-bit and 4-bit quantizations, i.e., M = 2, 4, 8 and 16 respectively, at the sensors.
As per our intuition, we observe an improvement in both the detection performance (KLD)
as well as security performance (αblind). Therefore, for a given α, the Byzantine attack can
be mitigated by employing finer quantization at the sensors. Of course, the best that the
designer can do is to let the sensors transmit unquantized data to the FC, whether in the
form of observation samples or their sufficient statistic (likelihood ratio). In this case, we
can see that αblind = 1, since lim
M→∞
M − 1
M
= 1.
4.5.2 Distributed Estimation
In this section, we consider the problem of estimating a scalar parameter of interest, de-
noted by θ ∈ R, in a distributed sensor network. As described in the system model, we
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Figure 4.3: Contribution of a sensor to the overall KLD at the fusion center as a function
of α, for different number of quantization levels. The pentagrams on the x-axis correspond
to the αblind for 1-bit, 2-bit, 3-bit and 4-bit quantizations respectively from left to right.
assume that the ith sensor quantizes its observation ri into an M-ary symbol ui, and trans-
mits vi to the FC. If the ith node is honest, then vi = ui. Otherwise, we assume that the
sensor is compromised and flips ui into vi using a flipping probability matrix P. Under
the assumption that the FC receives the symbols v over an ideal channel, the estimation
performance at the FC depends on the probability mass function P (v|θ).
The performance of a distributed estimation network can be expressed in terms of the
mean-squared error, defined as E
[
(θˆ − θ)2
]
. In the case of unbiased estimators, this mean-
squared error is lower bounded by the Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB) [53], which pro-
vides a benchmark for the design of an estimator at the FC. We present this result in Equa-
tion (4.38):
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E
[
(θˆ(v)− θ)2
]
≥ 1
IFC
, (4.38)
where
IFC = E
[(
∂ logP (v, θ)
∂θ
)2]
. (4.39)
The term IFC is well known as the Fisher information (FI), and is, therefore, a performance
metric that captures the performance of the optimal estimator at the FC. Note that, as shown
in Equation (4.40), IFC can be further decomposed into two parts, one corresponding to
the prior knowledge about θ at the FC, and the other (denoted as JFC) representing the
information about θ, in the sensor transmissions v:
IFC = JFC + E
[(
∂ log p(θ)
∂θ
)2]
, (4.40)
where
JFC = E
[(
∂ logP (v|θ)
∂θ
)2]
. (4.41)
In most cases, a closed form expression for the mean-squared error is intractable and,
therefore, conditional Fisher information (FI) is used as a surrogate metric to quantify the
performance of a distributed estimation network. In this chapter, we also use conditional
FI of the received data v as the performance metric. Since the sensor observations are
conditionally independent resulting in independent v, we denote the conditional FI as JFC
and is defined as follows:
JFC = NJFC , (4.42)
where
JFC = E
[
∂
∂θ
logP (v|θ)
]2
= −E
[
∂2
∂θ2
logP (v|θ)
]
. (4.43)
Following the same approach as in Section 4.5.1, we consider the problem of finding an
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optimal resource-constrained Byzantine attack when α < αblind, by finding the symmetric
transition matrix P that minimizes the conditional FI at the FC. This can be formulated as
follows.
Problem 4.2. Given the value of α, determine the optimal P within a space of highly
symmetric row-stochastic matrices, as given in Equation (4.23), such that
minimize
p
JFC
subject to 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
M − 1
.
Theorem 4.5 presents the optimal flipping probability that provides a solution to Prob-
lem 4.2. Note that this result is independent of the design of the sensor network and,
therefore, can be employed when the Byzantine has no knowledge about the network.
Theorem 4.5. Given a fixed α <
M − 1
M
, the flipping probability p that optimizes P over
a space of highly symmetric row-stochastic matrices, as given in Equation (4.23), by mini-
mizing JFC is given by
p∗ =
1
M − 1 .
Proof. For the sake of notational simplicity, we let zm = P (u = m|θ). Similarly, z˜m =
P (v = m|θ). Using this notation in Equation (4.43), we have
JFC =
M∑
m=1
P (v = m|θ)
(
∂ logP (v = m|θ)
∂θ
)2
=
M∑
m=1
z˜m
(
∂ log z˜m
∂θ
)2
= (1−Mαp)2
M∑
m=1
1
z˜m
(
∂zm
∂θ
)2
.
(4.44)
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Partially differentiating JFC with respect to p, we have
∂JFC
∂p
= 2(1−Mαp)(−Mα)
M∑
m=1
1
z˜m
(
∂zm
∂θ
)2
+ (1−Mαp)2
M∑
m=1
(
− 1
z˜2m
)
(α−Mαzm)
(
∂zm
∂θ
)2
= −(1−Mαp)
[
2Mα
M∑
m=1
z˜m
(
1
z˜m
∂zm
∂θ
)2
+ (1−Mαp)
M∑
m=1
α
(
1
z˜m
∂zm
∂θ
)2
−(1−Mαp)
M∑
m=1
Mαzm
(
1
z˜m
∂zm
∂θ
)2]
= −(1−Mαp)
[
α(1−Mαp)
M∑
m=1
(
1
z˜m
∂zm
∂θ
)2
+Mα(1 +Mαp)
M∑
m=1
zm
(
1
z˜m
∂zm
∂θ
)2]
.
(4.45)
In Equation (4.45), we have a negative term multiplied by a non-negative term, and hence
we have
∂JFC
∂p
≤ 0. (4.46)
Since JFC is a non-increasing function of p, p∗ =
1
M − 1 , being the maximum value, is
the optimal solution to Problem 4.2.
Numerical Results
As an illustrative example, we consider the problem of estimating θ = 1 at the FC based
on all the sensors’ transmitted messages. Let the observation model at the ith sensor be
defined as follows:
ri = θ + ni, (4.47)
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where the noise ni is the AWGN at the ith sensor with probability distribution N (0, σ2).
The sensors employ the same quantizer as the one presented in Equation (4.37). The quan-
tized symbol, denoted as ui at the ith sensor, is then modified into vi using the flipping
probability matrix P, as given in Equation (4.6).
Figure 4.4 plots the conditional FI corresponding to one sensor, for different values of
α and M , when the uniform quantizer is centered around the true value of θ. Note that as
SNR increases (σ → 0), we observe that it is better for the network to perform as much
finer quantization as possible to mitigate the Byzantine attackers. On the other hand, if
SNR is low, coarse quantization performs better for lower values of α. This phenomenon
of coarse quantization performing better under low SNR scenarios, can be attributed to the
fact that more noise gets filtered as the quantization gets coarser (decreasing M ) than the
signal itself. On the other hand, in the case of high SNR, since the signal level is high,
coarse quantization cancels out the signal component significantly, thereby resulting in a
degradation in performance.
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(a) Low SNR case: σ = 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
α
J
F
C
 
 
1−bit
2−bit
3−bit
4−bit
(b) High SNR case: σ = 0.01
Figure 4.4: Contribution of a sensor to the overall conditional FI at the FC as a function of α, for different number of quantization levels
when θ = 0 and A = 2. The pentagrams on the x-axis correspond to the αblind for 1-bit, 2-bit, 3-bit and 4-bit quantizations respectively
from left to right.
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4.6 Reputation-based Detection of Byzantine Nodes
Given that the distributed inference network is under Byzantine attack, we showed that the
performance of the network can be improved by increasing the quantization alphabet size
of the sensors. Obviously, in a bandwidth-constrained distributed inference network, the
sensors can only transmit with the maximum possible M , which is finite. In this section,
we assume that the network cannot further increase the quantization alphabet size due to
this bandwidth constraint. Therefore, we present a reputation-based Byzantine identifica-
tion/mitigation scheme, which is an extension of the one proposed by Rawat et al. in [52],
in order to improve the inference performance of the network.
4.6.1 Reputation-Tagging at the Sensors
As proposed by Rawat et al. in [52], the FC identifies the Byzantine nodes by iteratively up-
dating a reputation-tag for each node as time progresses. We extend the scheme to include
fine quantization scenarios, i.e., M > 2, and analyze its performance through simulation
results.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the FC receives a vector v of received symbols
from the sensors and fuses them to yield a global decision, denoted as θˆ. We assume that
the observation model is known to the network designer, and is given as follows:
ri = fi(θ) + ni, (4.48)
where fi(·) denotes the known observation model. We denote the quantization rule em-
ployed at the sensor as γ. Therefore, the quantized message at the sensor is given by
ui = γ(ri). As discussed earlier, the ith sensor flips ui into vi using a flipping probability
matrix P. Since the FC makes a global inference θˆ, it can calculate the squared-deviation
112
di of each sensor from the expected message that it is to nominally transmit as follows:
di =
(
γ−1(vi)− fi(θˆ)
)2
, (4.49)
where γ−1(vi) is the inverse of the sensor quantizer γ(vi) and it is assumed to be the cen-
troid of the corresponding decision region of the quantizer vi.
Note that vi is the received symbol which characterizes the behavior (honest or Byzan-
tine) of the ith sensor, while fi(θˆ) is the signal that the FC expects the sensor to observe.
If the ith sensor is honest, we expect the mean of di to be small. On the other hand, if the
ith sensor is a compromised node, then the mean of di is expected to be large. Therefore,
we accumulate the squared-deviations di = {di(1), · · · , di(T )} over T time intervals and
compute a reputation tag Λi(di), as a time-average for the ith node as follows:
Λi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
di(t). (4.50)
The ith sensor is declared honest/Byzantine using the following threshold-based tagging
rule
Λi
Byzantine
≷
Honest
η. (4.51)
The performance of the above tagging rule depends strongly on the choice of η. Note
that the threshold η should be chosen based on two factors. Firstly, η should be chosen in
such a way that the probability with which a malicious node is tagged Byzantine is high.
Higher the value of η, lower is the chance of tagging a node to be Byzantine and vice-
versa. This results in a tradeoff between the probability of detecting a Byzantine vs. the
probability of falsely tagging an honest node as a Byzantine. Secondly, the value of M
also plays a role in the choice of η, and therefore, the performance of the tagging rule. We
illustrate this phenomenon in our simulation results.
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4.6.2 Optimal Choice of the Tagging Threshold as T →∞
In this chapter, we denote the true type of the ith node as Ti, where Ti = H corresponds to
honest behavior, while Ti = B corresponds to Byzantine behavior, for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Earlier, in this section, we presented Equation (4.51) which allows us to make inferences
about the true type. But, the performance of the Byzantine tagging scheme corresponding
the ith sensor is quantified by the conditional probabilities P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = T ), for both
T = H,B. In order to find the optimal choice of η in Equation (4.51), we continue with the
Neyman-Pearson framework even in the context of Byzantine identification, where the goal
is to maximize P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = B), subject to the condition that P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = H) ≤ ξ.
To find these two conditional probabilities P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = H) and P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = B),
we need a closed form expression of the conditional distributions, P (Λi|Ti = H) and
P (Λi|Ti = B) respectively. In practice, where T is finite, it is intractable to determine the
conditional distribution of Λi, which is necessary to come up with the optimal choice of η.
Therefore, in this section, we assume that T →∞ and present an asymptotic choice of the
tagging threshold η used in Equation (4.51).
As T → ∞, since di(t) is independent across t = 1, · · · , T , due to central-limit theo-
rem, (Λi|Ti = T ) ∼ N (µi,T , σi,T ), where
µi,T = E(Λi | Ti = T )
= E
[(
γ−1(vi(t))− θˆ(t)
)2
| Ti = T
] (4.52)
and
σ2i,T = Var(Λi | Ti = T )
=
1
T
Var
[(
γ−1(vi(t))− θˆ(t)
)2
| Ti = T
] . (4.53)
In this section, we do not present the final form of µi,T and σi,T in order to preserve
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generality. Assuming that vi(t) is independent across sensors as well as time, the mo-
ments of di can be computed for any given FC’s inference θˆ(t) at time t about a given
phenomenon. Although the final form of µi,T and σi,T is not presented, since di(t) is a
function of v, we present the conditional probability of (vj|Ti = T ) in Equation (4.54),
which is necessary for the computation of µi,T and σi,T .
P (vj|Ti = T ) =
∫
P (vj|θ,Ti = T )p(θ)dθ, (4.54)
where P (vj|θ,Ti = T ) can be calculated as follows:
P (vj = m|θ,Ti = H) =

P (uj = m|θ), if j = i
(1− piBH)P (uj = m|θ) +
piBH
M∑
k=1
pkmP (uj = k|θ), if j 6= i
(4.55)
and
P (vj = m|θ,Ti = B) =

M∑
k=1
pkmP (uj = k|θ), if j = i
(1− piBB)P (uj = m|θ) +
piBB
M∑
k=1
pkmP (uj = k|θ), if j 6= i
, (4.56)
where piBH = P (Tj = B|Ti = H) and piBB = P (Tj = B|Ti = B) are conditional
probabilities of the jth node’s type, given the type of the ith node. Since there are α fraction
of nodes in the network, given that the FC knows the type of ith node as H , the conditional
probability of the jth node belonging to a type T is given by piBH =
Nα
N − 1 and piBB =
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Nα− 1
N − 1 .
Given the conditional distributions P (Λi|Ti = H) and P (Λi|Ti = B), we find the
performance of the Byzantine identification scheme as follows:
P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = H) = Q
(
η − µi,H
σi,H
)
P (Λi ≥ η|Ti = B) = Q
(
η − µi,B
σi,B
) . (4.57)
Under the NP framework, the optimal η can be chosen by letting P (Λi ≥ η|i = H) =
β, when Λi is normally distributed conditioned on the true type of a given node. In other
words,
Q
(
η − µi,H
σi,H
)
= ξ (4.58)
or equivalently,
ηoptimal = µi,H + σi,HQ
−1(ξ). (4.59)
Note that, since P (vi|Ti = H) is a function of α, it follows that both µi,H and σi,H are
functions of α. Although we do not provide a closed-form expression for η as a function of
α, we provide the following example to portray how η varies with different values of α.
Example: Variation of η as a function of α
Consider a distributed estimation network with N = 5 identical nodes. Let the prior distri-
bution of the true phenomenon θ be the uniform distribution U (0, 1). We assume that the
sensing channel is an AWGN channel where the sensor observations is given by ri = θ+ni.
Therefore, the conditional distribution of the sensor observations is N (θ, σ2), when con-
ditioned on θ. We assume that the sensors employ the quantizer rule shown in Equation
(4.37) on their observations ri. At the FC, we let γ−1(·) be defined as the centroid function
that returns ci =
λi−1 + λi
2
. Let θˆ =
1
M
N∑
i=1
γ−1(vi(t)) be the fusion rule employed at the
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FC to estimate θ.
Since the network comprises of identical nodes, without any loss of generality, we
henceforth focus our attention on the reputation-based identification rule at sensor-1. Sub-
stituting the above mentioned fusion rule in the squared-deviation d1 corresponding to
sensor-1 in Equation (4.49), we have
d1 =
(
γ−1(v1)− 1
M
5∑
i=1
γ−1(vi(t))
)2
=
(
M − 1
M
γ−1(v1)− 1
M
5∑
i=2
γ−1(vi(t))
)2
.
(4.60)
Let us denote
φij = E
{(
γ−1(vi)
)j |T1 = H} = M∑
vi=1
[(
γ−1(vi)
)j
P (vi|T1 = H)
]
,
for all i = 1, · · · , 5 and j = 1, 2, · · · ,∞. Here, P (vi|T1 = H) can be computed using
Equation (4.55) as follows:
P (vi = m|T1 = H) =
∫ ∞
−∞
P (vi = m|θ,T1 = H) p(θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0
P (vi = m|θ,T1 = H) dθ
=

a1,m if i = 1
Nα
(N − 1)(M − 1) +
(
1− MNα
(N − 1)(M − 1)
)
ai,m otherwise.
(4.61)
where ai,m =
∫ 1
0
P (ui = m|θ) dθ, for all i = 1, · · · , N . Note that, since all the nodes
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in the network are identical, P (ui|θ) is independent of the node-index i, and therefore,
φij = φ2j , for all i 6= 1.
Thus, the conditional mean and variance, µ1H and σ21H , are given as follows for the
special case of N = 5:
µ1H = E
(M − 1
M
γ−1(v1)− 1
M
5∑
i=2
γ−1(vi(t))
)2
| Ti = H

=
1
M2
E
((M − 1)γ−1(v1)− 5∑
i=2
γ−1(vi(t))
)2
| Ti = H

=
1
M2
[
(M − 1)2φ12 + 4φ22 + 12φ221 − 8(M − 1)φ11φ21
]
(4.62)
and
σ21H =
1
T
Var
[(
γ−1(vi(t))− θˆ(t)
)2
| Ti = H
]
=
1
T
{
∆− µ21H
}
,
(4.63)
where
∆ = E
(M − 1
M
γ−1(v1)− 1
M
5∑
i=2
γ−1(vi(t))
)4
| Ti = H

=
1
M4
[
(M − 1)4φ14 − 16(M − 1)3φ13φ21 + 6(M − 1)2φ12{4φ22 + 12φ221}
−4(M − 1)φ11(4φ23 + 36φ22φ21 + 24φ321) + 4φ24 + 12φ23φ21
+36(φ23φ21 + φ
2
22 + 2φ22φ
2
21) + 24(φ
4
21 + 3φ22φ
2
21)
]
.
(4.64)
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Figure 4.5: Variation of the optimal tagging threshold η (in the asymptotic sense, where T →∞) as a function of α
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Thus, for ξ = 0.01, we compute the tagging threshold η numerically as shown in
Equation (4.59), and plot the variation of η as a function of α in Figure 4.5. Note that, in
our numerical results, we observe that the optimal choice of η is a convex function of α,
where the curvature of the convexity decreases with increasingM . This can be clearly seen
from Figure 4.5b, where we only plot the case of M = 7. We observe a similar behavior
for all the other values of M , and therefore, present the case of M = 7 to illustrate the
convex behavior of η. In other words, for very large values of M , the choice of η becomes
independent of α, for any fixed α ≤ αblind.
4.6.3 Simulation Results
In order to illustrate the performance of the proposed reputation-based scheme, we consider
a sensor network with a total of 100 sensors in the network, out of which 20 are Byzantine
sensors. Let the sensor quantizers be given by Equation (4.37) and the fusion rule at the FC
be the MAP rule, given as follows:
N∑
i=1
log
(
P (vi|H1)
P (vi|H0)
)
θˆ=1
≷
θˆ=0
log
p0
p1
. (4.65)
Figure 4.6 plots the rate of identification of the number of Byzantine nodes in the net-
work for the proposed reputation-based scheme for different sizes of the quantization al-
phabet set. Note that the convergence rate deteriorates as M increases. This is due to the
fact that the Byzantine nodes have increasing number of symbol options to flip to, because
of which a greater number of time-samples are needed to identify the malicious behavior.
In addition, we also simulate the evolution of mislabelling an honest node as a Byzantine
node in time, and plot the probability of the occurrence of this event in Figure 4.7. Just
as the convergence deteriorates with increasing M , we observe a similar behavior in the
evolution of the probability of mislabelling honest nodes. Another important observation
in Figure 4.7 is that the probability of mislabelling a node always converges to zero in time.
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Figure 4.6: Rate of identification of the number of Byzantine nodes in time for different
number of quantization levels
Similarly, we simulate the evolution of mislabelling a Byzantine node as an honest one in
time in Figure 4.8. We observe similar convergence of the probability of mislabelling a
Byzantine node as an honest node to zero, with a rate that decreases with increasing num-
ber of quantization levels, M . Therefore, Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 demonstrate that, after a
sufficient amount of time, the reputation-based scheme always identifies the true behavior
of a node within the network, with negligible number of mislabels.
4.7 Summary
In summary, we have modeled the problem of distributed inference with M-ary quantized
data in the presence of Byzantine attacks, under the assumption that the attacker does not
121
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Time
Pr
ob
. o
f l
ab
el
in
g 
ho
ne
st
 n
od
es
 a
s 
By
za
nt
in
es
 
 
1−bit
2−bit
3−bit
4−bit
Figure 4.7: Evolution of the probability of mislabelling an honest node as a Byzantine in
time for different number of quantization levels
have knowledge about either the true hypotheses or the quantization thresholds at the sen-
sors. We found the optimal Byzantine attack that blinds the FC in the case of any inference
task for both noiseless and noisy FC channels. We have also considered the problem of
resource-constrained Byzantine attack (α < αblind) for distributed detection and estimation
in the presence of resource-constrained Byzantine attacker for the special case of highly
symmetric attack strategies in the presence of noiseless channels at the FC. From the in-
ference network’s perspective, we have presented a mitigation scheme that identifies the
Byzantine nodes through reputation-tagging. We have also shown how the optimal tagging
threshold can be found when the time-window T →∞. Finally, we have also investigated
the performance of our reputation-based scheme in our simulation results, and showed that
our scheme always converges to finding all the compromised nodes, given sufficient amount
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Figure 4.8: Evolution of the probability of mislabelling a Byzantine node as an honest node
in time for different number of quantization levels
of time.
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CHAPTER 5
JAMMING ATTACKS IN DISTRIBUTED
DETECTION: POWER-ALLOCATION
AND PLACEMENT
Interference has always been a nuisance in the design of any electronic system. Most of
the past literature had addressed noise-like interference which disrupts the system uninten-
tionally. In contrast, jamming attacks are designed to introduce interference intentionally
so as to cause maximal degradation in their performance. In this chapter, we assume that
the sensors use a multiple access channel (MAC) to communicate their messages to the
FC. Given that there are fundamentally two types of channels in an inference network,
namely the sensing channel and the communication channel (MAC), we consider a general
jamming attack model which allows the jammer to distribute its energy across these two
channels. Such attack models are particularly useful in some practical applications such as
radar networks and cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio (CR) networks where
the sensing channel can be jammed using an electromagnetic signal1.
1In other applications where the PoI does not emit an electromagnetic signal, we can let the energy de-
ployed in the sensing channel to be zero.
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5.1 Literature Survey
Jamming attacks have traditionally been addressed in communication systems, where sev-
eral mitigation schemes have been proposed based on low probability of intercept (LPI)
techniques such as spectrum spectrum technology [38, 50] and adaptive filtering mech-
anisms [72]. Recently, a few authors have modeled the interaction between decision-
theoretic systems and jammers in a game-theoretic framework [2, 4, 55].
In the context of detection networks, there have been a few papers in the past which
addressed the problem of jamming attacks. In particular, in the context of ad-hoc wire-
less sensor networks, Wood and Stankovic have discussed several denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks in [74]. In [31], Li et al. presented optimal ad-hoc sensor network and jammer de-
signs under perfect knowledge of the channel-state information of all the channels. In the
context of spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks, Li et al. [29] proposed a channel-
hopping design for multi-band spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks under a game-
theoretic framework, where the radio tries to move from one channel to another in order to
evade interferers. In this chapter, we consider the problem of finding the optimal jamming
attack, which maximizes the error probability in a simple distributed detection network
where there is one sensor and one FC.
5.2 System Model
Consider a simple detection network in a one-dimensional field as shown in Figure 5.1,
where all the entities in our model lie on a straight line. We assume that our network model
consists of a single sensing agent located at xs and the FC located at xfc = 0. Let the
PoI be located at xt. Let the two hypotheses corresponding to the absence and presence of
PoI be denoted as H0 and H1 respectively, each with a prior probability P (H0) = p0 and
P (H1) = p1 = 1− p0.
Consider a random jammer located at xJ , trying to maximally degrade the performance
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Figure 5.1: Detection Network Model
of the network under a power constraint PJ . Therefore, the jammer distributes the available
power between the two channels: the sensing channel and the communication channel. Let
the two jamming signals be denoted as ws and wfc corresponding to the sensing and the
communication channels respectively. We assume that these two jamming signals follow
ws ∼ N (0, σ2Ws) and wfc ∼ N (0, σ2Wfc) respectively. Thus, the power constraint on the
jammer can be formally stated as σ2Ws + σ
2
Wfc
≤ PJ .
In this chapter, we assume that the observation at the ith sensing agent is modeled as
follows.
rs = hs · θ + gs · ws + ns (5.1)
where hs =
1
1 + α(xi − xt)n and gs =
1
1 + α(xi − xJ)n are the path-loss coefficients to
the PoI-sensor channel and the jammer-sensor channel respectively, both with exponent n
and attenuation factor α. We assume that the PoI’s state is modeled using a binary variable
θ, which takes the value 0 under hypothesis H0, and 1 otherwise. Furthermore, we assume
that ni ∼ N (0, σ2s).
The sensor processes its observation rs into a binary antipodal symbol u using the
following quantizer rule.
rs
u=+1
≷
u=−1
λs. (5.2)
Let PF and PD be the probabilities of false alarm and detection respectively, at the sensor.
Assuming that the path-loss coefficients for all the channels are known, we have
PF = P (rs ≥ λs|H0) = Q
 λs√
σ2s + g
2
sσ
2
Ws
 (5.3a)
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PD = P (rs ≥ λs|H1) = Q
 λs − hs√
σ2s + g
2
sσ
2
Ws
 (5.3b)
When the sensor transmits this binary symbol u, the FC receives a signal
rfc = hfcu+ gfcwfc + nfc, (5.4)
where hfc and gfc are path-loss coefficients for the communication channel and the jammer-
to-FC channel respectively. The FC makes a global inference regarding the PoI using the
following decision rule:
rfc
H1
≷
H0
λfc. (5.5)
We consider error probability at the FC as the performance metric, which is defined as
PE = p0QF + p1(1−QD) (5.6)
where
QF = P (rfc ≥ λfc|H0) = PFQ
 λfc − hfc√
σ2fc + g
2
fcσ
2
Wfc
+(1−PF )Q
 λfc + hfc√
σ2fc + g
2
fcσ
2
Wfc
 ,
(5.7a)
QD = P (rfc ≥ λfc|H1) = PDQ
 λfc − hfc√
σ2fc + g
2
fcσ
2
Wfc
+ (1−PD)Q
 λfc + hfc√
σ2fc + g
2
fcσ
2
Wfc

(5.7b)
are the false alarm and detection probabilities at the FC respectively.
In this chapter, we assume that the thresholds λs and λfc are the optimal thresholds that
minimize the error probability of the detection network in the absence of the jammer. In
the following subsection, we compute these optimal thresholds at both the sensor and the
FC.
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5.2.1 Network Design in the Absence of Jammer
In this subsection, we find the optimal thresholds λs and λfc, such that the error probability
PE is minimized in the absence of a jammer. Since there is no jamming signal in our model,
we have ws = wfc = 0. Consequently, the average power of the jamming signals reduces
to σ2Ws = σ
2
Wfc
= 0. Therefore, the design of a detection network reduces to the following
problem.
Problem 5.1. Determine the thresholds λs and λfc such that
arg min
λs,λfc
PE
where PE can be found by substituting σ2Ws = σ
2
Wfc
= 0 in Equation (5.6). Assuming
that all the nodes’ locations are known, all the channel-coefficients are treated as constants
in the above problem. In such a case, the above problem of designing the detection rules
jointly at the sensors and the FC is NP-Hard in general [63]. Therefore, we provide closed-
form expressions for the thresholds λs and λfc by addressing the above problem in a person-
by-person-optimization (PBPO) framework.
Theorem 5.1. The optimal thresholds λs and λfc that minimize PE in a PBPO manner, in
the absence of the jammer are given by
λs =
hs
2
− σ
2
s
hs
ln
p1
p0
(5.8a)
λfc =
σ2fc
2hfc
ln
1 + p1 − p0
p0Q
(
λs
σs
)
− p1Q
(
λs − hs
σs
)
 (5.8b)
Proof. First, we consider the optimization at the sensing agents. The optimal detector at
the local sensing agents can be calculated from its likelihood ratio test (LRT), which is
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defined as follows.
p(rs|H1)
p(rs|H0)
H1
≷
H0
p0
p1
(5.9)
Substituting the conditional distributions p(rs|H0) and p(rs|H1), and applying loga-
rithms on both sides, we have
1
2σ2s
[
r2s − (rs − hs)2
] H1
≷
H0
ln
p0
p1
(5.10)
On further simplification, we find that the optimal local detection rule is given by
rs
u=1
≷
u=0
(
hs
2
− σ
2
s
hs
ln
p0
p1
)
, λs. (5.11)
Similarly, the optimal decision rule at the FC is an LRT, which is given as follows.
p(rfc|H1)
p(rfc|H0)
H1
≷
H0
p0
p1
. (5.12)
On simplification, we get
rfc
H1
≷
H0
σ2fc
2hfc
1 + p1 − p0
p0Q
(
λs
σs
)
− p0Q
(
λs − hs
σs
)
 , λfc. (5.13)
Given that the network employs the thresholds presented in Theorem 5.1, we investi-
gate optimal strategies at the jammer in terms of its location and power distribution across
sensing and communication channels under the assumption that the jammer has complete
information regarding the detection network. Note that the impact due to such a genie-aided
jammer serves as an upper-bound on the performance loss at the FC.
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5.3 Numerical Study of Optimal Jamming Attack
In this section, we investigate the problem in which the jammer’s goal is to optimize its
attack within the total available power by inflicting maximum performance deterioration
to the detection network. We assume that the jammer has three control parameters - one
being its location xJ , and the other two being the energy distributions to the sensing and
the communication channels, namely σ2Ws and σ
2
Wfc
respectively. The jammer distributes
its total available power optimally between the sensing and the communication channels,
while simultaneously finding its optimal location so that the error probability at the FC is
maximized.
We state this problem formally, as follows.
Problem 5.2. Given the detection network as stated in Theorem 5.1, determine the optimal
power distribution at the jammer as follows.
maximize
σ2ws ,σ
2
wfc
,xJ
PE
subject to 1. E(w2s) + E(w
2
fc) ≤ PJ .
where Condition 1 represents the total power constraint at the jammer. Furthermore,
we also assume that the jammer has complete knowledge about the detection network - the
decision rules, node locations and also the prior information about the PoI. Therefore, this
genie-aided scheme, although not feasible in practice at the jammer, serves as an upper
bound on the impact that the jammer can cause on the CR network.
Due to the complicated structure of PE with respect to the three jammer’s parameters
xJ , σ2Ws and σ
2
Wfc
, the problem is analytically intractable. Therefore, we investigate the
optimal jammer’s strategy numerically in the following subsection.
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5.3.1 Results and Discussion
In our numerical results, we assume isotropic signal power attenuation models for all the
channels’ gains where the decaying exponent n varies between 2 and 3 as in free-space
RF propagation models. We further assume σs = σfc = 0.1 in our results in Figures
5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. In Figures 5.2a, 5.3a, 5.4a and 5.5a, the blue curve indicates the
error-probability at the FC as a function of jammer’s location, and the red curve represents
the the performance of the cognitive radio network in the absence of the jammer. Note
that, as the jammer moves away from the network, we observe that the impact of jammer’s
attack becomes weaker and approaches the red curve even though the jammer employs
optimal σ2Ws and σ
2
Wfc
. On the other hand, Figures 5.2b, 5.3b, 5.4b and 5.5b show how
the power is optimally distributed by the jammer between the sensing (red curve) and the
communication (green curve) channels.
Note that in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, we observe that the optimal jamming attack against
the network is to employ the total available energy to either jam the sensor’s channel or the
FC’s channel. The attack is more severe if the jammer is located closer to the CR. As
the observations are processed in the CR, noise margin also increases, not allowing the
jammer to maximally degrade the transmission channels at the FC. Since the maximum
useful information about the PU activity is available at the CR receptions (data-processing
inequality from information-theory [16]), the jammer tries to invest more resources on
jamming the CR receptions if it is located close to the CR. Note that if the jammer is far
away from the FC, then the optimal attack is to direct all its energy to jam the sensor itself.
If the jammer is closer to the FC, then the jammer has to distribute its energy between the
two channels to bring maximal impact to the CR network.
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Figure 5.2: Optimal Jamming attack when xs = 3, xt = 6, p0 = 0.5, α = 1, PJ = 0.5 and n = 2
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Figure 5.3: Optimal Jamming attack when xs = 3, xt = 6, p0 = 0.5, α = 1, PJ = 0.5 and n = 2.3
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Figure 5.4: Optimal Jamming attack when xs = 2, xt = 6, p0 = 0.5, α = 1, PJ = 0.5 and n = 2
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Figure 5.5: Optimal Jamming attack when xs = 1, xt = 6, p0 = 0.5, α = 1, PJ = 0.5 and n = 2
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One can also observe from Figures 5.2 and 5.3 that as the decaying exponent increases,
the performance of the network degrades. Also, the jammer has a choice to be closer to
either the sensor or the fusion center due to the multimodal nature of PE as a function of
xJ . While in the case of Figures 5.4 and 5.5, as compared to Figure 5.2, the CR node is
very close to the FC, while the PU transmitter is located far away from the CR network.
Hence the jammer has greater impact when it is close to the network. Note that PE is now
a unimodal quasi-convex function of the location of the jammer, xJ since the jammer need
not distribute its energy due to the close proximity of FC to the CR node.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel attacking scheme for the jammer that can distribute its
limited resources over different possible channels utilized for communication in a cognitive
radio network. A specific example was considered for the network design where the CR
network has only one CR node, to illustrate how a jammer can attack a given network. We
presented the optimal distribution of jammer’s energy resource between the sensing and the
communication channels, and also illustrated how the jammer chooses an optimal location
in our simulation results. We have also presented an interesting scenario where the jammer
totally focuses its attack on the sensor’s reception alone, irrespective of its location.
136
CHAPTER 6
JAMMING ATTACKS IN CENTRALIZED
DETECTION: STRATEGIC GAMES
In contrast to Chapter 5, we model a complete-information zero-sum game between a cen-
tralized detection network and the jammer in this chapter, where the jammer’s strategy is to
design its interfering signals rather than energy distribution across the sensing and the com-
munication channels. Furthermore, in this chapter, we consider a more powerful jamming
attack than the one in Chapter 5 [42, 43] by assuming multiple antennas at the jammer
for transmitting its interfering signals in both sensing and communication channels. We
choose the error probability at the FC as the performance metric (utility) in this game,
which the network tries to minimize by appropriately choosing the threshold in its fusion
rule, while the jammer tries to maximize it by choosing an appropriate jamming signal. We
find closed-form expressions for the optimal pure strategies and show that the jammer has
no impact on the error probability at the FC due to pure-strategies. We also prove that the
network and the jammer converge to one of these pure-strategy equilibria when they play
best-response strategies iteratively from any initial point within the space of all possible
strategy-profiles. In other words, the jammer has no incentive to employ pure strategies
since the network can nullify its impact completely. Therefore, we investigate the impact
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of mixed strategies on the network performance and show that the jammer is more effective
when it employs mixed strategies.
6.1 Literature Survey
In the past, several efforts have been made to model the interaction between jammers and
communication systems in a game-theoretic setting. In particular, a seminal paper [4]
by Basar addressed this framework for the first time in 1983, where the author modeled
the interaction between a point-to-point communication system and an intelligent jammer
as a complete-information zero-sum game in a decision-theoretic framework. While the
communication system is designed to minimize the mean-square error at the receiver, the
jammer tries to maximize this distortion. Assuming that the jammer is equipped to wire-
tap the communication channel, the paper presents optimal (equilibrium) strategies under
different channel conditions (low, mid and high signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver). Later,
several papers have been published in this topic with the label "correlated jamming" under
different scenarios and networked systems [6, 25, 56, 73]. For more details about this line
of work, the reader may refer to a well-written survey by Sagduyu et al. in [55].
In the context of inference networks, a few efforts have been made to study jamming
attacks in a game-theoretic setting. Apart from our work presented in Chapter 5 and [42]
within the context of detection networks, Akyol et al. in [2] have studied the interaction be-
tween a Gaussian sensor network (distributed estimation network with a Gaussian source)
and a jammer. While the network is designed to minimize the receiver’s mean square er-
ror, the jammer employs a strategy to maximize the distortion. In this paper, the authors
assume that the jammer can also acquire observations regarding the PoI (Gaussian source),
and only jams the multiple access communication channel. They have shown that the opti-
mal network strategy requires sensors to collaborate in order to enable identical realization
of a randomized encoding scheme. The authors have also shown that the optimal strate-
138
Sensor
1
Jammer
FC
PoI
s1 sN wsL
wfcM
rfc
wfc1
ws1
Sensor
N
Figure 6.1: Detection Network in the Presence of a Jammer
gies are uncoded in one-shot games, and that a Stackelberg game (sequential interaction
between the network and the jammer) does not admit an equilibrium solution.
6.2 System Model
Consider a detection network with N sensing agents and a fusion center (FC) which makes
a global decision regarding the presence/absence of the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI) in
the presence of a disruptive jammer, as shown in Figure 6.1. Let H1 denote the hypothesis
when PoI is present, and H0 otherwise, with prior probabilities pi1 and pi0 respectively. We
assume that the PoI’s signal is modeled as θ = 1 under H1, and θ = 0 otherwise.
In this chapter, we denote the channel between the PoI and any given sensor as a sensing
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channel, and the channel between the sensors and the FC as a communication channel. We
assume that the communication channel at the FC is a multiple access channel (MAC),
where all the sensors’ messages are superimposed into one received signal at each antenna
at the FC. The disruptive jammer interferes with both the sensing and the communication
channels by introducing the jamming symbols ws and wfc respectively. For the sake of
notational convenience, we stack these jamming symbols together into a super-symbolw =
{ws,wfc}.
If αi and βil denote the known channel-gains at the ith sensing channel due to the PoI
signal and the lth antenna at the jammer respectively, the ith sensor acquires an observation
si as
si = αiθ +
L∑
l=1
βilwsl + ni, (6.1)
where ni is a zero-mean AWGN noise with variance σ2s .
We assume that the ith sensor transmits its raw observation si over the MAC. The FC
receives the combined signal
rfc =
N∑
i=1
φisi +
M∑
m=1
ψmwfcm + nfc
=
N∑
i=1
φi
(
αiθ +
L∑
l=1
βilwsl + ni
)
+
M∑
m=1
ψmwfcm + nfc
= aθ + bTw + z,
(6.2)
where
a =
N∑
i=1
φiαi, z =
N∑
i=1
φini + nfc, (6.3a)
bT =
[
N∑
i=1
φiβi1 · · ·
N∑
i=1
φiβiL ψ1 · · · ψM
]
. (6.3b)
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We assume that the FC employs a decision rule1
rfc
H1
≷
H0
λ, (6.4)
where λ ∈ Λ2 is a real-valued threshold designed to minimize the FC’s error probability
PE = pi0QF + pi1(1−QD). (6.5)
while the jammer simultaneously attempts to maximize PE by employing an appropriate
jamming signal w.
6.3 Jamming Games with Strict Power Constraints
In this section, we assume that the jammer has a strict power constraint, i.e., ||w||22 ≤ P .
We denote the set of all possible strategies at the jammer as
W , {w ∈ RL+M | ||w||22 ≤ P}.
Since rfc is a superposition of the PoI’s signal with several Gaussian random vari-
ables, the conditional distributions of the received signal at the FC are given by rfc|H0 ∼
N (bTw, σ2) and rfc|H1 ∼ N (a+ bTw, σ2), where σ2 = σ2fc + σ2s
N∑
i=1
φ2i is the variance
of the noise signal z.
1Since this is a likelihood ratio test, all the other rules are dominated. Therefore, their removal does not
result any loss in network performance.
2Although λ can be any real number in practice, for the sake of tractability, we assume that Λ , [−R,R],
where R is a sufficiently large real number. For more details, the reader may refer to Theorem 5, Page 168
in [5] which guarantees the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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Consequently, the error probability PE at the FC stated in Equation (6.5), is given by
PE = pi0QF + pi1(1−QD)
= pi0Q
(
λ− bTw
σ
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
λ− bTw − a
σ
)]
.
(6.6)
Within this framework, we investigate pure-strategy equilibria when the jammer has
strict power constraints. We also study the convergence of these pure-strategy equilibria
when the detection network and the jammer interact in a repeated game setting. In the
latter part of the section, we analyze the effectiveness of mixed strategies at the jammer in
comparison to the pure strategy equilibria.
6.3.1 Evaluation of Pure Strategy Equilibria
While the FC employs a strategy λ∗ that minimizes PE , the jammer employs a counter
strategy w∗ that maximizes PE . We model this interaction formally as a zero-sum game
between the FC and the jammer in the following problem statement.
Problem 6.1. Find the Nash equilibria {λ∗,w∗} ∈ Λ × W that satisfy the following in-
equality:
PE(λ
∗,w) ≤ PE(λ∗,w∗) ≤ PE(λ,w∗)
∀ λ ∈ Λ, w ∈ W .
Before we solve the above problem statement, we investigate some important properties
of PE . These properties of PE guarantee the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Lemma 6.1. For a given b, w and σ, PE is a quasiconvex function of λ.
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Proof. In order to prove quasiconvexity of PE , we adopt an approach, similar to that em-
ployed in Lemma 1 in [76]. For a fixed b, w and σ, we first differentiate PE with respect
to λ as follows.
∂PE
∂λ
= pi0
∂QF
∂λ
− pi1∂QD
∂λ
= f1(λ) · [pi1f2(λ)− pi0]
(6.7)
where
f1(λ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(λ− b
Tw)2
2σ2
)
, (6.8a)
f2(λ) = exp
(
2a(λ− bTw)− a2
2σ2
)
. (6.8b)
Note that f1(λ) ≥ 0. Therefore, the value of f2(λ) decides the behavior of PE . One can
easily observe that f2(λ) is an exponential function of λ and is, therefore, a monotonically
increasing function of λ. Hence, there is only one value of λ = λ0 at which f2(λ) = 0. As
a result, we have
∂PE
∂λ
≥ 0 whenever λ ≥ λ0, and ∂PE
∂λ
< 0, otherwise. In other words,
PE is a quasi-convex function of λ.
Note that channel models with non-negative channel gains ensure that every element
in the vector b is non-negative. Since many practical channel models such as path-loss
model and Rayleigh fading model have non-negative channel gains, we assume that b is a
non-negative vector in the rest of this section.
Lemma 6.2. For a given λ, b and σ, PE is jointly quasiconcave inw, if every entry in b is
non-negative.
Proof. Given any two points w1,w2 ∈ W , PE is jointly quasiconcave [10] if and only if
PE(w1) ≤ PE(w2) ⇒ ∇wPE(w1) · (w1 −w2) ≤ 0. (6.9)
Therefore, we first consider the necessary condition PE(w1) ≤ PE(w2) and expand it
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as follows:
PE(w1)− PE(w2) ≤ 0
⇔ pi1
[
Q
(
λ− bTw1 − a
σ
)
−Q
(
λ− bTw2 − a
σ
)]
−pi0
[
Q
(
λ− bTw1
σ
)
−Q
(
λ− bTw2
σ
)]
≥ 0
⇔
∫ y1
y2
g(y)dy ≥ 0.
(6.10)
where
g(y) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
{
−(y − λ)
2
2σ2
}
·
[
pi1 exp
(
2a(λ− y)− a2
2σ2
)
− pi0
]
,
(6.11)
and y1 = bTw1 and y2 = bTw2 are the integral limits.
Given that the values of b, λ and σ are fixed, we differentiate PE with respect to w to
have the following.
∇wPE(w1) = pi0∇wQF (w1)− pi1∇wQD(w1)
= −b · g(y1).
(6.12)
In other words, whenever Equation (6.10) holds true, we need to show that the following
condition holds true.
∇wPE(w1) · (w1 −w2) = −g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≤ 0. (6.13)
Equivalently, we need to show that
g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≥ 0. (6.14)
Before we prove the above condition, as given in Equation (6.14), we investigate the
144
behavior of the function g(y). Note that the function g(y) is of the following form.
g(y) = f3(y) · [pi1f4(y)− pi0] , (6.15)
where
f3(y) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(λ− y)
2
2σ2
)
, (6.16a)
f4(y) = exp
(
2a(λ− y)− a2
2σ2
)
. (6.16b)
Note that f3(y) ≥ 0. Since f4(y) is a monotonically decreasing function of y, we have
g(y) ≥ 0 whenever y ≤ y0, and g(y) < 0 whenever y > y0, where y0 is the unique
zero-crossing point at which f4(y0) =
pi0
pi1
.
Therefore, we prove the theorem statement case-by-case as shown below.
CASE-1 [y0 ≤ y1, y2] Given that y0 ≤ y1, y2, we have g(y) ≤ 0 for any y between y1
and y2. In such a case, the necessary condition given in Equation (6.10) holds true when
y1 ≤ y2. In other words, g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≥ 0 whenever Equation (6.10) holds true in this
case.
CASE-2 [y1, y2 ≤ y0] Given that y1, y2 ≤ y0, we have g(y) ≥ 0 for any y between y1
and y2. Therefore, the necessary condition in Equation (6.10) holds true when y2 ≤ y1. As
a result, g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≥ 0 whenever Equation (6.10) holds true in this case.
CASE-3 [y1 ≤ y0 ≤ y2 or y2 ≤ y0 ≤ y1] Note that this is a trivial case. This is because
of the following. If y1 ≤ y0 ≤ y2, both g(y1) and (y1 − y2) are negative. On the other
hand, if y2 ≤ y0 ≤ y1, both g(y1) and (y1 − y2) are positive. Either way, their product
g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≥ 0 whether or not, the necessary condition in Equation (6.10) holds
true.
Given that PE is quasi-concave-convex in nature, a pure strategy solution exists due
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to the classic Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan existence theorem [5, 17]. Therefore, we start by
investigating the necessary conditions that a pure-strategy equilibrium would satiate.
Proposition 6.1. The optimal threshold λ∗ = arg min
λ
PE(λ,w) for a fixed jammer’s strat-
egy w is given by
λ∗ = bTw + c (6.17)
where c =
1
2a
[
a2 + 2σ2 log
(
pi0
pi1
)]
is a constant. Furthermore, PE(λ = λ∗,w) is inde-
pendent of w.
Proof. We first consider the inner optimization in the max-min problem where we mini-
mize PE with respect to λ for a fixed jammer’s strategy w. The optimal λ = λ∗ satisfies
∂PE
∂λ
= f1(λ) · [pi1f2(λ)− pi0] = 0, (6.18)
where f1(λ) ≥ 0. Thus, if f2(λ) = pi0
pi1
, we have
∂PE
∂λ
= 0. Substituting Equation (6.8b)
and rearranging terms, we have
λ∗ = bTw + c (6.19)
where c =
1
2a
[
a2 + 2σ2 log
(
pi0
pi1
)]
is independent ofw, and b is given in Equation (6.3b).
Given a fixed jammer’s strategy w, if the FC employs the optimal threshold λ∗, from
Equation (6.19), the error probability at the FC is given by
PE(λ
∗,w) = pi0Q
( c
σ
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
c− a
σ
)]
. (6.20)
Note that PE(λ∗,w) is independent of the jammer’s strategyw, as stated in the proposition
statement.
Note that the best response strategy employed by the network, as shown in Equation
(6.19), is unique for a fixed jammer’s strategy w. Furthermore, the jammer’s signal intro-
duces a linear shift to the point λ = c, which is optimal in the absence of the jammer.
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On the other hand, when we investigate the optimal jammer’s strategy w∗ by consider-
ing the min-max framework, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2. The optimal jammer’s strategy w∗ = arg max
w
PE(λ,w) for a fixed
threshold λ satisfies
bTw∗ = λ− c. (6.21)
where c =
1
2a
[
a2 + 2σ2 log
(
pi0
pi1
)]
. Such a pure-strategy solution exists only when
c−
√
P · bTb ≤ λ ≤ c+
√
P · bTb. (6.22)
Proof. A similar approach to the proof of Proposition 6.1 can be followed in finding Equa-
tion (6.21). Therefore, we focus our attention in finding the existence condition, given in
Equation (6.22).
In order for a pure-strategy solution to exist, w∗ should lie within the set of strategies
that satisfy the jammer’s total power budget. In other words, we need (w∗)T w∗ ≤ P .
Therefore, the affine function given in Equation (6.21) should be within the squared-
distance of P units from the origin w = 0. In other words, we have
(λ− c)2
bTb
≤ P. (6.23)
Note that this condition can also be equivalently stated as given in Equation (6.22).
Note that the jammer’s best response strategy is not unique, as shown in Equation
(6.21). Indeed, there are infinite possibilities since the jammer can adopt any strategy on a
line segment without any regret.
Combining the results from Propositions 6.1 and 6.2, we have the following main result
of this section.
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Theorem 6.1. For every −b ≤  ≤ b,
λ∗ = c+
√
P
bTb
bT, w∗ =
√
P
bTb
 (6.24)
is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. At the above equilibrium point, the error probability
at the FC is given by
PE(λ
∗,w∗) = pi0Q
( c
σ
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
c− a
σ
)]
. (6.25)
Proof. As stated in Proposition 6.2, λ∗ varies between c −
√
P · bTb and c +
√
P · bTb.
Therefore, we first investigate the extreme points λ∗1 = c −
√
P · bTb and λ∗2 = c +√
P · bTb.
We first consider the case where λ∗1 = c −
√
P · bTb. Comparing this threshold to
the optimal threshold from Equation (6.19), we have λ∗1 = b
Tw + c = c −
√
P · bTb.
On simplification, we find that w∗1 = −
√
P
bT b
b is the optimal jammer’s strategy. Thus,
λ∗1 = b
Tw + c = c −
√
P · bTb and w∗1 = −
√
P
bT b
b form a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Similarly, it is easy to show that λ∗2 = c +
√
P · bTb and w∗2 =
√
P
bT b
b is another pure-
strategy equilibrium.
Given these two pure-strategy equilibria, we find a parametric representation of all
possible pure-strategy Nash equilibria, as given below. Let
w∗ =
√
P
bTb
 (6.26)
where  is the vector parameter that ranges from −b and b. Note that the two solutions
w∗1 and w
∗
2 both correspond to the parameter values 1 = −b and  = b respectively.
Furthermore, such a linear parameterization is valid because of the fact thatw∗ always lies
on the line bTw∗ = λ− c, as given in Equation (6.21).
148
Substituting Equation (6.26) in Equation (6.19), we have
λ∗ = c+
√
P
bTb
bT. (6.27)
Since the equilibrium point satiates the necessary conditions presented in Propositions
6.1 and 6.2, the error probability at the FC is given by Equation (6.20).
6.3.2 Convergence in Repeated Games
In this section, we first investigate if the pure strategy equilibrium is attainable in practice
in a repeated setting. Since the network and the jammer do not communicate to agree and
play a pure strategy equilibria, it is necessary to analyze their convergence in a repeated
game setting. Therefore, in this section, we first investigate the convergence of the players’
strategies in a repeated game setting from any arbitrary strategy profile employed by the
network and the jammer. We denote the initial pure strategy profile as (λ0,w0), where the
total power of the initial jammer’s strategy w0 is within the jammer’s power budget P .
Lemma 6.3. Given any pure strategy profile (λ0,w0), the players always converge to one
of the equilibria presented in Theorem 6.1 in a perfectly-observable repeated-game irre-
spective of the order of their play.
Proof. In proving this lemma, we make an assumption that the players’ strategies are per-
fectly observable, i.e., the network makes noiseless observations regarding the jammer’s
strategy and vice-versa. Under such an assumption, we prove the lemma in two cases. In
the first case, we assume that the network takes the lead, followed by the jammer and so
on. In the latter case, we assume the opposite where the jammer takes the lead, followed
by the network and so on.
CASE-1 [N-J-N-J-· · · ] In this case, we assume that the network takes the lead. There-
fore, given the initial strategy profile (λ0,w0), the network chooses its best response from
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Proposition 6.1, which is
λ1 = b
Tw0 + c. (6.28)
Given that ||w0||22 ≤ P , without any loss of generality, we can represent w0 in the same
form as shown in Theorem 6.1. As a result, λ1 also has the form presented in Theorem 6.1.
Thus, the repeated game converges to an equilibrium point (λ1,w0) within one iteration.
CASE-2 [J-N-J-N-· · · ] In this case, we assume that the jammer takes the lead. There-
fore, given the initial strategy profile (λ0,w0), the jammer chooses its best response as
stated in Proposition 6.2. In other words, if λ0 lies between c−
√
P · bTb and c+
√
P · bTb,
the jammer chooses its best response w1a such that
bTw1a = λ0 − c. (6.29)
Otherwise, the jammer employs a strategy w1b = ±b where the sign of w1b matches to
sign(λ0 − c). In such a case, the network adopts a best response strategy
λ1 = c±
√
P · bTb. (6.30)
In summary, if λ0 lies between c−
√
P · bTb and c+
√
P · bTb, the repeated game con-
verges to an equilibrium point (λ0,w1a) in one iteration. Else, the repeated game converges
to an equilibrium point (λ1,w1b).
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6.4 Effectiveness of a Gaussian Jammer with Average
Power Constraint
Given that both the network and the jammer converge rationally to the pure strategy equi-
librium presented in Theorem 6.1, pure-strategies are practically ineffective at the jammer.
This is because the error probability at the FC under such equilibrium solutions is totally
independent of the jammer’s strategy. In fact, the error probability at the FC in the presence
of a jammer is identical to the FC’s performance in the absence of a jammer (i.e., w = 0).
In such a case, there is no incentive for the jammer to launch its attack as the network can
easily mitigate its impact with very minimal effort.
Given that pure strategies are not beneficial to the jammer, we now investigate if mixed
strategy equilibria can help deteriorate the network performance. For the sake of illustra-
tion and tractability, we further relax our problem by assuming that the jammer admits an
average power constraint. In other words, if W = E(wwT ) denotes the covariance matrix
of the jamming signalw, then we have Tr(W ) ≤ P . Furthermore, we assume that the jam-
mer employs additive Gaussian noise such that w ∼ N (0,W ). In the following lemma,
we demonstrate that a Gaussian jammer with an average power constraint, as stated above,
has a greater impact than that of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 6.4. When the network employs its best response (mixed) strategy to the jammer’s
mixed strategy, the expected utility (average error probability) due to a Gaussian jammer
with an average power constraint is always greater than the error probability under pure-
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Given a fixed threshold λ at the FC, the error probability at the FC turns out to be
P˜E(λ) = pi0Q
(
λ√
σ2 + bTWb
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
λ− a√
σ2 + bTWb
)]
. (6.31)
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Note that P˜E(λ) is a quasiconvex3 function of λ. In other words, if the network employs
a mixed strategy, the optimal (best response) distribution is given by p(λ) = δ(λ∗), where
λ∗ = c+
1
a
bTWb log
pi0
pi1
is the optimal threshold that minimizes P˜E(λ), and δ(x) is a Dirac
delta function centered at x. Thus, the expected utility (minimum P˜E(λ)) due to a Gaussian
jammer is
U(W ) = pi0Q
c+ bTWb
1
a
log
pi0
pi1√
σ2 + bTWb
+ pi1
1−Q
c− a+ bTWb
1
a
log
pi0
pi1√
σ2 + bTWb

 .
(6.32)
Note that U(W ) is a quasiconvex4 function of W , with its minimum at W being an
all-zero matrix. In other words,
U(W ) ≥ PE(λ∗, w∗), (6.33)
where PE(λ∗, w∗) is given in Equation 6.25. Consequently, the jammer has every incentive
to use a mixed strategy rather than employing a deterministic (pure) strategy.
6.4.1 Illustrative Example
For the sake of illustration, we study the properties of saddle point equilibria in the fol-
lowing cognitive radio (CR) network example, where a Gaussian jammer (interferer) is
equipped with one antenna each for the sensing and the communication channels, to inject
a random Gaussian signal in each of these channels. We assume that there are N = 20
CRs in the network, whose locations are defined using a Binomial point process [71] over
the 10 × 10 grid centered about the origin. Furthermore, we assume that the FC, primary
user (PU) and the jammer are located at xfc = (0, 0), xt = (−3,−4) and xj = (1,−2)
respectively. We assume σs = 0.1, σfc = 0.1 and PJ = 0.5. Also, we assume free-space
3Proof is similar to our approach in Lemma 6.1.
4The proof is similar to our approach in Lemma 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: CR Network for pi0 = 0.5 case
path loss shadowing with each path loss coefficient taking the form
√
1
(1 + d2{·})
, where
d{·} is the propagation distance between the transmitter node and the receiver node in the
above mentioned system-model.
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Figure 6.4: CR Network for pi0 = 0.8 case
First, in Figure 6.3, we present error probability as a function of λ, σWfc and σWs for
the CR network shown in Figure 6.2. In this case, we let pi0 = 0.5, which is the worst
case performance scenario of the network. The plots depict clearly both quasiconvexity
with respect to λ and monotonicity with respect to the interfering node’s parameters, σWfc
and σWs , especially when λ ≥ 0. In this case, as per our intuition, we numerically find
λopt =
a
2
.
Figure 6.5, on the other hand, presents the error probability as a function of λ, σWfc
and σWs for pi0 = 0.8. We particularly present these results because pi0 = 0.8 is found in
practice as pointed out by the FCC’s survey on spectrum utilization of licensed bands [77].
One can clearly note that the NE of the game from the network’s perspective has now
moved away from λ =
a
2
, due to the bias in the prior probabilities.
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One can also note from Figures 6.3 and 6.5 that in both the scenarios considered, the
optimal jammer degrades the individual CRs’ performance by allocating all the available
power to the sensing channel (σ2Ws = 0.5 and σ
2
Wfc
= 0). This is similar to our numerical
results in Chapter 5, where we had studied the optimal jamming attack on a simple detection
network. Such a strategy can also be justified as per our intuition, since the jammer will
always invest all of its resources to interfere with the most vulnerable channel available (one
with maximum information about the spectrum availability) in order to have the maximal
impact on network performance. Given that the sensing channel carries the maximum
amount of information regarding the true state of the PoI, the jammer employs all its power
in the sensing channel to cause maximal impact on the network performance.
Note that all our results point to another important observation regarding the effec-
tiveness of mixed strategies at the jammer. A Gaussian jammer with enough resources
(PJ = 0.5 in this example) can bring the error probability PE close to 0.5, which is the
worse case performance at the FC. In other words, although the jammer has no incentive
to employ pure strategies, it can simply inject Gaussian signals into the sensing channel to
launch a very powerful denial-of-service attack on the detection network.
6.5 Summary
We have modeled the interaction between a centralized detection network and a jammer as a
zero-sum game. We have obtained a family of pure strategy Nash equilibria in closed-form,
and proved that the pure-strategy jamming attacks have no impact on the error probability
at the FC. We have also shown that both the players will converge to one of the equilibrium
points proposed, in a perfectly-observable repeated game irrespective of the order of their
play. We also showed that the jammer has an incentive to employ a mixed strategy since the
expected utility (average error probability due to mixed strategies) is always greater than
that in the case of pure-strategy equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
7.1 Summary
With a broad range of applications, security threats in inference networks have a significant
impact on several practical domains. This dissertation focused on the design and analy-
sis of secure inference networks under three attack scenarios: (a) eavesdropping threats
in detection networks in Chapters 2 and 3, (b) Byzantine attacks in distributed inference
networks in Chapter 4, and, (c) jamming attacks in detection networks in Chapters 5 and 6.
Following is a brief summary of this dissertation.
In Chapter 2, we have considered the design of binary quantizers for secure distributed
detection networks in the presence of an eavesdropper. If the goal is to maximize the dif-
ference between the KL Divergences at the FC and Eve, we have shown that the optimal
binary quantizers are the same as when maximizing the KL Divergence at the FC alone.
In contrast, in the case of identical sensors and channels, we have proved that the opti-
mal binary quantizers at the sensors are likelihood-ratio test-based, and have presented a
numerical algorithm to find the optimal threshold. In the case of non-identical sensors
and channels, we have presented a greedy algorithm to find efficient, near-optimal binary
quantizers at the sensors. On the other hand, in Chapter 3, we have proposed an efficient
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transmit-diversity mechanism at the sensing agents (which are equipped with multiple an-
tennas) in the context of centralized detection networks. While the sensing agents amplify
and forward their raw observations to the FC, they also inject artificial noise in order to
confuse Eve. Since the problem of finding the optimal transmit-diversity mechanism is
non-convex, we presented a near-optimal solution using semidefinite relaxation.
In Chapter 4, we have investigated optimal Byzantine attacks in the presence of both
ideal and non-ideal (discrete, memoryless) communication channels, when the sensing
agents quantize their observations into an M -ary symbol. We have also studied optimal
resource-constrained Byzantine attacks when the attacker cannot compromise the blinding
fraction of nodes in the network. Furthermore, we have also proposed a novel deviation-
based reputation mechanism to identify Byzantine nodes in the network.
In Chapter 5, we have investigated an optimal jamming attack in a distributed detection
network, where the goal of the jammer is to maximize error probability at the FC by op-
timizing its placement and power allocation between the sensing and the communication
channels. Since the problem is non-convex, we have considered a simple network where
there is only one sensing agent. For the sake of illustration, we have assumed that all the
entities (sensing agent, FC, PoI and the jammer) lie on a straight line, and presented nu-
merical results that throw light on the jammer’s optimal strategy. In contrast, in Chapter 6,
we have modeled the interaction between the jammer and a centralized detection network
as a complete-information zero-sum game. We have found closed-form expressions for a
family of pure-strategy equilibria when there is a strict power constraint on the jammer. In
addition, we have also shown that the jammer has no incentive to employ a pure-strategy,
but instead, chooses mixed strategies to alleviate detection performance at the FC. We have
also investigated mixed strategy equilibria numerically in the presence of a Gaussian jam-
mer.
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7.2 Future Research Directions
Security in any domain/application is evolutionary, and demands novel designs and solu-
tions as the attacker evolves in time. In this dissertation, we have investigated three basic
security threats in inference networks, each belonging to a class within the CIA framework.
Given the evolutionary nature of security attacks, several open problems still remain un-
solved in this field, even within the three security threats addressed in this dissertation. We
discuss some of these open problems for future work in the remaining section.
• Eavesdropping Attack: A direct extension to our current work is to explore other
methods (e.g. convex-concave approximation) to solve the non-convex optimal trans-
mit diversity design problem efficiently in order to further improve the detection per-
formance of the inference network. Similar problems still remain open within the
context of other inference networks which are designed to address inference prob-
lems such as statistical estimation, classification, prediction, tracking and so on.
Given that there is a tradeoff between detection performance and security, it is neces-
sary to find a methodology to detect the presence of eavesdroppers. In practice, this
is a difficult problem especially when the eavesdropper remains passive and does not
emit any electromagnetic radiation.
• Byzantine Attack: The problem of designing an optimal inference network still re-
mains open under the non-asymptotic regime (finite number of sensors in the infer-
ence network) when the sensors transmit M-ary quantized data to the FC. Further-
more, in the case of resource-constrained Byzantine attacks, the problem of finding
the optimal Byzantine attack in the space of all row-stochastic flipping probability
matrices still remains open. Moreover, the problem of designing a secure inference
network, along with mitigation techniques in the presence of heterogeneous sensing
agents still remains open.
• Jamming Attack: Given that the problem of designing an optimal jamming attack
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in distributed detection networks is a non-convex problem, one can explore effi-
cient approximations to find near-optimal designs at both the jammer and the net-
work. Also, the problem of finding mixed-strategy equilibria in our proposed game-
theoretic framework still remains open under strict power constraints at the jammer.
One interesting technique worth investigating, is to study the effects of diversity due
to the presence of multiple receiving antennas at the FC, on the network performance
in the presence of a jammer.
Note that, in Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6, we have assumed complete channel-state infor-
mation at both the network and the attacker. This may not be possible in practice, and
therefore, security should be addressed in the presence of incomplete information about
the channel gains at both the network and the attacker.
In addition to the open problems discussed in the context of three security threats dis-
cussed in this dissertation, the study of other security threats in parallel-topology inference
networks still remains open. For example, several other attack models such as a Sybil at-
tack [46] have already been proposed in the context of ad-hoc sensor networks. Security
threats in other network topologies also remain open. For example, secure tree-topology
inference networks in the presence of eavesdropping and jamming attacks remain open.
More recently, there have been several efforts in designing optimal network topologies in
inference networks where sensing agents collaborate with each other in order to maximize
energy efficiency of the network [23, 32, 33]. Security in such inference networks is a very
interesting topic, as it provides many venues (for example, denial-of-service attacks via
skipping transmissions) for the attacker to bring down the network.
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